

# The Image of the Sultanate State in Arab History, The Controversy of Unity and Division between Legality and Legitimacy

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## Introduction

In using the terms of legality and legitimacy I came across two terminologies, *Légal* and *Légitime*, in the Arabised *Leland Philosophy Encyclopedia*. The entry 'Légitime Legitimité' in general is 'Said of all actions, attitudes or feelings, or of any saying expressing a person's full right as in legitimate defense or legitimate action'. In this sense the word 'legal' is more accurate.

As for the term 'legal', it means, in general, adhering to laws. It is the feature of what is controlled by law or laws (*Leland Philosophy Encyclopedia*, vol. 2, p723-724).

In the Larousse Dictionary, the term *Légitimité* (legitimate) is the status or condition of whatever is based on lawful rights, justice and equality. However, it should be noted that legitimacy in this wide definition of moral dimensions is different from the legality of law. Some issues of justice and fairness cannot be effectively resolved within the outlined work frame of law. Therefore, laws or rights can result in unjust side effects.

It is worth noting that dictionary usage of modern Western political language does not differ much from that of the history of sultanates, emirates and wilayats(\*\*) in Islamic history. Whatever was legal at those times, had always been based on Islamic Shari'ah, especially its constitutions (the Holy

Qur'an and Hadeeth) and other tools, such as reason, analogy and consensus, used for deriving laws from these constitutions. Shari'ah references cover both existing legality and renewable legitimacy, ie. it what is legal or exists in Shari'ah, and what is 'legitimate' or justified in reference to Shari'ah or by means of force. Usually, or in most cases, the two things are gravely mixed, a dilemma that is evident in some of Mawerdi's or Ibn Khaldun's texts — creating an emirate or sultanate by means of force is a legitimate act in the mindset of its initiators. However, by means of necessity (advancing a state free of chaos and dissolution) it becomes legal, but always within the framework of laws that have been mutually debated (controversy between political laws of a sultanate, wilayat and religious laws).

This was a page of a long history. When new nation states appeared in modern Arab and Islamic history, new controversies emerged in the form of new descriptions, like unity and

division, and the legality or legitimacy of each state of these.

This piece of writing is an initial attempt to look deep into the continuous controversy associated with the state in Arab history, starting from the *asabiya*-based(\*\*\*) sultanate to a national state in contemporary political literature.

## **The Controversy of Asabiya and Religious Authority in the Establishment of States in Arab history**

A closer look at the history of how sultanate states started in Arab-Islamic history, and their dynamics, structures, systems and ideologies reveals a historic controversy between *asabiya* as a sociopolitical tool of conflict in society and Shari'ah as seen in thinking, *fiqh* and different Islamic schools, ie. *fiqh* and intellectual opinions resulting in various

schools based on Islamic teachings to justify legality in religious rules and strengthening legitimacy of sultanate policies.

Ibn Khaldun's theory on states, in fact, is a reflection of the historic experience of states in different stages of Arab-Islamic history going back and forth between the two authorities mentioned earlier: *asabiya* and Shari'ah. Ibn Khaldun stresses the importance of *asabiya*, ie. force in the rise of a state, but also says that Shari'ah is important in legalising the establishment of a state. He says, 'Arabs do not get to rule unless by cover of religion, prophecy, social status or a great religious role.'<sup>1</sup>

This controversy, in fact, explains why Ibn Khaldun is looked at differently today in the eyes of *fiqh* scholars, on one hand, who see him as 'deceived by the looks of a state based on *asabiya*, as Rasheed Ridha puts it, which, in their view,<sup>2</sup> is different from the Caliphate

in Islam. On the other hand, today's nationalist intellectuals try to compare the concept of Ibn Khaldun's *ummah* (nation) with the concept of 'nation' in European minds in the 19th century.<sup>3</sup>

This difference is creating a historic dilemma. In my view, despite the fact that *asabiya*-based states are supported by religion or Shari'ah, as Ibn Khaldun puts it, it could not shape Islam into a certain ideology of *ummah* similar to the ideology of nation. Islam remained the highest authority of *ummah* and is used as a tool to highlight opposing opinions or ideologies and to justify its legitimacy based on Islamic laws. The *ummah's* ideology is legitimate even if it sometimes conflicts with Shari'ah or existing laws, or the *fiqh* of the Islamic school followed by the state.<sup>4</sup>

**The State\Society Notion between Claimed Legality and Calls for Legitimacy**

The relationship between ruling people and ruled people in Islamic history were of an authoritarian nature over people, and not a relationship of fusion and integration. This is evident in the forms of authorities and policies of inclusion through different tools as a result of the interaction between the *asabiya*-based states (rulers) and the people who constitute the nation and its different *asabiyas*, schools and ideologies.

This interpretation of the dilemma in the relationship between governments and the people perhaps explains the gap between the two in Islamic history, which still lingers between the legality of rulers and their people and the legitimacy of having the right of constant rule based on emerging *asabiya*. The concept of *ummah* referring to an Islamic human community has not fully integrated in the state. The Islamic Arab states, since the Omayyad and even after the Ottomans,

expanded based on *asabiya*'s superior powers. *ummah*, on the other hand, took the shape of a community characterised by plurality, diversity and even division on different levels:

- Diversity due to the extent of divisions evident in the different opinions and schools on Shari'ah.
  
- Diversity at the level of co-existence with other heavenly messages (the system of *milal* — religions — in the Ottoman days.
  - Diversity due to *asabiya* clashes between tribes, clans or families.
  
- Diversity at the level of loyalty to different cities and districts.

- Diversity at the level of nationalities and peoples.

- Diversity at the level of craft groups (types and Sufi ways).

Based on this, it is possible to say the following: the rulers are the superior *asabiya* groups surrounded by allies and loyal groups. Those do not justify their state by their social background or representation of the people, but by claiming to be guardians and followers of Shari'ah. Their state is neither an integrated nationalist state, as per contemporary understanding, nor a regional state, as seen in contemporary geopolitics and modern international relationships starting with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia in Europe or the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne in Turkey and the eastern Arab countries.

Ibn Khaldun's concepts somehow summarise and provide indications of the state experience in Islamic history regarding its rise, formation, expansion and downfall. On the other hand, those concepts also provide theories and rich methods of understanding unity and division, and therefore accept the dynamics and reality as truthful and legitimate, and justify loyalty to them one after another.

Ibn Khaldun, when reviewing the process of a state's division, does not associate a state to a region or geographic area even if the state has been essentially based on geographical foundations or what Ibn Khaldun calls *qasia* or *taraf* (peripheries).<sup>5</sup> An emerging state remains a follower of the bigger state and derives its legality from it, or, based on its stronger *asabiya* or religious calls, abandons the old state and replaces it or competes with it for legality as a legitimate right.

Therefore, states on the periphery are acknowledged by the existing large state without war, while a state based on religious ideology is seen as a threat to the large state and as a sign of disloyalty or sometimes competition. Ibn Khaldun describes this when he says,

*Emerging states fall into two categories: states at the peripheries that disappear if the big state's authority recedes. They do not usually demand much from the big state; whatever they have in hand would be enough for them. The other type is called khawarij (religion based) and those have demands because they usually have power. These demands are usually backed by enough pride and asabiya to rage constant wars between the two until one gets the other.<sup>6</sup>*

This theoretical political classification of states in Arab Islamic history could serve as a starting point for understanding the

mechanism of the sociopolitical conflict that results in unity or division; unity in the case of a general *asabiya* state, or division in the case of different states of different *asabiya*, ethnicities, tribes or religious schools that live together in different peripheries in short periods, or wage wars against each other to try to overcome the majority and eventually become the biggest state or authority in 'Islam's House'. This was the case of many states such as the Buyids and Seljuqs, Mamluks and Elkhaneen, and the Ottomans, Mamluks and Safavids, let alone the starting of the Abbasid-Umayyad conflict, the Abbasid-Fatimid conflict and other family conflicts in the Maghreb and Andalusia, and conflicts between small states at the peripheries opposing the central state like the Qarmatians and Ismailids. It is a dilemma of the continuous relationship between the party who has the legality on the part of the state and those who seek legality in the name of a broader or relative legitimacy.

It has been noticed though that many historians over emphasise the ideological part of the legality of these states, or what Ibn Khaldun calls the ‘religious interface’ of *asabiya* or the ‘religious effect’. They also stress the national aspect of the rise of these states. Some see, in the Ottoman-Safavid conflict, a religious conflict between Shi’a and Sunni, and some view the rise of the state in Iran as an ethnic or Persian *asabiya*, for example.

In my opinion, if this is true, at the risk of fueling the conflict, it should not eliminate the level of conflict and its long-term goals. The field of conflict, as seen by Khaldun, is the notion of ‘state scope’. It is, firstly, the geopolitical field of the emerging state, and secondly, the expansion of this scope on the financial activities and interests, which translates into taxes and customs duty on whatever crosses a trade route, or on the markets that formed in the Asian and Mediterranean area. This also includes any

area to which Islam spreads and becomes a potential entity for inclusion and integration, or for division and disintegration at the levels of religion, civilisation or means of transportation, and trade centres.<sup>7</sup>

Whenever a state emerges somewhere inside the scope of this market, its people would, due to the increasing need of collecting taxes, want to include the peripheries and expand their state, especially when it comes to strategic areas or a commodities' transportation or excise route.

## **Unity and Division under Legality and Legitimacy**

These, in my opinion, are the missing or neglected aspects of Arab-Islamic history. Neglecting these aspects suppresses the controversy on movement of unity and division of this period of history. Such

movements were justified by legality as in the case of existing states and by legitimacy with resistance and overthrowing the state (legalising the state of overthrowing). This controversy is bound only to the ideology or declared religious discourse of each party paving the road for conflict based on religious schools or nationalities. The reality of this conflict does not allow diversity but only unity by means of overcoming and inclusion of other parties and ideologies. This reality resembles the history of the sultanate state, which regards overtaking and overthrowing as legitimate rights and the religious interface as a legal cover.

A closer look and study at the geopolitical and economic dimensions of the two co-existing experiences of the Ottoman and the Safavids would reveal hidden key aspects for understanding the controversy of unity and division in the history of sultanate states in Islamic history.<sup>8</sup>

This history holds two movements:

1. A unifying movement seen in the dynamics of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire in the first two centuries of its establishment, and its capacity to seamlessly include and combine legality and legitimacy for a long Islamic time
2. A dividing movement seen in the dissolution of its economic and military systems, starting from the second half of the 16th century, which coincided with many influential regional and international events such as:
  - The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope as a route to India, which marginalised the role of the Mediterranean
  - The discovery of the New World, and the following stockpiling wealth in the

coastal cities of Europe, and opening up of intercontinental trade at the cost of

old Mediterranean passages

- At the regional level of the Islamic world, a new competitive sultanate emerged

— Safavid in Iran.

The Safavid unified the small states and carried forward its own religious teachings, and competed with the existing Ottoman state. They wanted to expand on the geopolitical scope of the Ottomans (Anatolia, Iraq, the Gulf, and the eastern coast of the Mediterranean) and competed with them economically by attempting to control land and sea passages between Europe and Asia (the Silk Route).

The point of reviewing this history is to understand the Ottoman-Iranian wars in the historic context of the ‘European Renaissance’

and its natural readiness for a huge industrial revolution. The key element of the international transformation was the superiority of European communities in military weapons, warships and institutionalised systems and organisations. Just after the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the New American World, the Mediterranean began to lose its role as a key economic player in history, and the Islamic world turned into a war zone between its two major internal powers. It can be inferred that this internal conflict, in the bigger picture, was looking for a way out of the recession of Mediterranean trade through attempts to control the passageways and ports leading to Europe, whose ports, at that time, were full of gold and silver brought from the New American World. After the two key players had exhausted their powers, their economies were so downtrodden that they could not hope for 'resurrection' unless through foreign concessions and the expansion of foreign trade. Local crafts and commodities were so down in the face of a huge surge of European

commodities that internal affairs, if compared to the strength of trade, prices, tariffs and manpower, were unable to stand up to the unequal international competition.

All these events and interactions paved the road for an unequal relationship between the West and the Islamic east, ie. the centre that led to the industrial revolution and the peripheries that suffered internal wars, marginalisation and dependence on foreign concessions.

The sultanate state in this historic scene is no longer the state that Ibn Khaldun mentioned in stages of rise, summit and downfall. It is no longer based on the *asabiya*, by religious enforcement or by the old controversy of unity-division. It is a sultanate state with a historical heritage that does not control or influence the destiny of the state. European policies prevailed and were decisive in matters of directing, controlling, utilising, investing or

even reforming and structuring, as in the case of the Ottoman organisations and European policies towards such organisations.

This historic scene, in fact, would hold the seeds of downfall of the communities of this state based on the historic heritage itself in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, but this time with new concepts and notions such as minorities, national independence, ethnicities, modern administrations. etc., and due to clear interaction with the policies of foreign powers.

It is also noticeable that the sultanates' unifying/diversifying policies (Ottoman Empire in its early stages) included local power sources. This kind of inclusion was possible in certain sociopolitical times; those of craft systems, agricultural investment, feudalism, sects and traditional social structures of families, tribes and village groups, providing legitimacy and paving the

way for legality. However, this kind of inclusion was not possible in view of the dissolution of its communities as a result of capitalism and European policies, and the increasing national, ethnic, social and political conscience.

This is what many Ottoman renaissance intellectuals, *fiqh* scholars and reformers tried to fix through different methods of reform, organisation, and *fatwa*, but the dissolution was too deeply engraved in international policies and decisions, and with diplomats and experts.

### **International Policies and the Legitimacy of Reality (Local Authorities establishing National States)**

The Ottoman administration was characterised by centrality and strict policies, especially at the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid,

who practiced central tyranny, and at the time of Committee of Union and Progress, who practiced a military dictatorship with discriminative Turkish policies. On the other hand, other social powers were looking to establish their own local authorities through local councils or through refusal to join the central Ottoman powers, and, at the same time, searching for legal foundations for their independence. Europe was, at that time, observing the situation closely in order to utilise whatever power could serve its own political ventures. This interaction between the internal conflicts and Western policies resulted in a state of chaos in the different regions or districts, as reported by Midhat Basha, an Ottoman Wali in Iraq and Syria in the 1880s, besides the reports of consuls in the capitals of the wilayats, who observed the conditions, studied their social symptoms and foresaw their future direction.

Perhaps what the French Chancellor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote on 30th May

1920 reflects the function of the political chaos as seen by the strategic Western mindset.

The Chancellor said,

*In the territories that were once part of the Ottoman Empire, the chronic historic conflict between the concept of 'state' and the concept of 'nation' has led to the emergence of a chaotic mindset, and the people had to form small groups based on ethnicities or regions. This reality is convenient for us as it makes circulating resistance in the whole empire a difficult task. On the other hand, more dissolution may put us in a similarly stressful situation.*

The Chancellor concludes with the following,

*I find it a chance to push studies on potential ethnic groups that may start their first autonomous regional authority.<sup>9</sup>*

This Western understanding of what the French Chancellor called ‘historic controversy between the state and the nation’ comes from observing the crisis that the Ottoman system tried to tackle through centralising the state, ie. transforming the old *asabiya*-based sultanate into a modern state, similar to the state\ nation model. Turkish nobles and some Arabs find the term ‘Ottoman home’ expressive of this tendency, which was basically an attempt to unite the administration, institutions and laws of different communities of different languages, religions, ethnicities, sects, traditions and customs. As a result, a number of political movements emerged on the peripheries, especially in the rural mountain areas and western cities, refusing to be part of the central Ottoman authority.

However, these movements failed for many reasons. That failure itself, regardless of its reasons, made the West conclude that a kind of ‘chaotic mindset’ prevailed over the people, and that dissolution on the basis of ethnicity, religion and sect was an inevitable key solution for the ‘controversy between the concepts of state and nation’, as the French Chancellor put it.

As the French Chancellor proposed, many anthropological, historical, economic and social studies were conducted to justify the ‘appropriate’ political practices of the disintegrating region, which would eventually serve the policies of the Western powers in the eastern Arab countries.

The truth is that what the West sees as ‘permanent features’ or fixed traits of Arab-Islamic society, was no more than a state of dissolution and Western influence in Ottoman society.

Whereas the ethnic groups that took clear shape in the Ottoman system served as a justification for the West to resolve the so-called 'chaotic mindset' through the formation of independent smaller 'states', the policies of local authorities that used the system's laws in their favour in courts, municipalities, committees and different functions, allowed, on the other hand, international policies to create 'local interfaces'. Moreover, the ethnic groups and the policies of local authorities interacted to form authorities looking for 'geopolitical' legality through adoption of the state\ nation notion.

The French Chancellor said, 'There should be strong local interfaces whom we can move behind without holding responsibility.' He commented on the efficiency of the Ottoman system, which gave the local authorities a lot of space in their own affairs,

*Recently, Archbishop Khorri, head of the Lebanese delegation in Paris, was asked about ways that allowed the Ottoman to keep their system alive with limited resources. He gave the same answer he had given to general Goro, that the Turkish authorities achieved the balance between the different groups of the population with little interference in their internal affairs or interests.<sup>10</sup>*

However, the Ottoman understanding of the European model was a justification for sociopolitical dissolution, and the attempts to contain the situation in local interfaces. These interfaces were, in the French plans, similar to Ottoman local authorities as the latter had achieved ‘some balance’ in the diverse population. The difference between the local Ottoman authorities and the authorities proposed in Western plans to be local interfaces is the difference between two histories:

1. The long sociopolitical Ottoman history with its power sources as key pillars of the political balance of the Ottoman authority, which also secured its historic legitimacy and part of its religious legality regardless of local conflicts aimed at occupying certain positions in the structure of sultanate authorities.
2. The sociopolitical history of European influence in which some local family groups emerged in the Ottoman system as 'new figures' looking for opportunities to ensure themselves local authorities based on administrative power, land possession and capital of foreign investment.

The overlapping of the three factors of the new figures in point 2 instructed the European

policy makers to adopt these directions in view of the latter accepting the role of local interfaces of the mandate. This was a page of one history followed by pages of another history.

## **Conclusion**

What is the meaning of reviewing history, specifically the sultanate state experience and its society in the Islamic history, in the context of examining diversity, legality and legitimacy?

It is natural to say that ‘history does not repeat itself’, even if it carries factors that may lead to thinking of similarities between phenomenon and big events, or between actions and human reactions, which restore continuous matters in the different geographical environments of civilisations, as Braudel sees for example.

Such restoration, however, is always changing and adapting to major transformations in international history. Reference to history does not function, isolated from history as a whole, as a foundation for understanding the present and foreseeing the future. Reference to history continues in the understanding of the history of individuals and groups through memories of pictures, ideals and even myths and superstitions. The advancement of knowledge of sciences and humanities today offers us methods and ways of interpretation and reasoning. Memories, be they in the form of stories, news or mental images, are fields of study, scrutiny and conclusion. This is the function of history, the way it was founded by Ibn Khaldun. Unfortunately, this ideology did not crystallise in the subsequent history of the Arabs.

This subject faces two key problems:

First is the issue of unity and division at the level of state. In the past, there was some kind of plurality and diversity in the times of the caliphate and sultanate of Islam's history. They emerged from the roles and functions of the *asabiya* of tribes, nations and cities that formed the geopolitics and humanity of 'Islam's house'. They further constitute the roles of sultanates and emirates by seizure, and wilayats 'legalised; by Islamic *fiqh*. At the same time, there was a tendency toward geopolitical and economic unity that extended the boundaries of the sultanate by means of force and inclusion. This unity was supported by 'religious cover' and without doubt carried its 'legitimacy' elements in parallel with the legitimacy held, as a reality, by sultanates and emirates.

In modern history, there was a 'division' that took place within some areas under Western influence at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. There was also some kind of state plurality in the form of

independent states established on the basis of national sovereignty of a state or region. But at the same time there was a movement towards Islamic or national unity as a reaction to the divisions. It followed the footsteps of the sultanate unity example in an Arab manner, just like the Omayyad dynasty in the nationalists' mindset, or in an Islamic manner, just like the Ottoman's caliphate or sultanate state in the Islamists' mindset.

These two issues overlap (in the past and present) in history as a 'reference', sometimes to justify the call for or rise of dynamics of 'unity', or to justify the reality of multiple states in the name of local history.

Reality, however, points to a different historic and future direction. The 'division' that is usually emphasised as being a 'colonial act' in historic and national literature is, without any doubt, an undeniable reality and a factor in the establishment of modern states

and entities. However, in the 20th century this 'division' gained different social, political, economic and intellectual dimensions, which were evident in the emergence of institutions and administrative structure, and at the level of production and consumption, economic interests and national loyalty within each state. These dimensions and aspects became living facts, not only at the level of the state, but also at the level of citizens, ie. they gained legality at the emerging state level, and legitimacy at the national community level.

These new transformations in the notion of division have given it new meanings that overcame its negative historic connotations of colonial division. It has become an integrated, existing and legitimate reality, but, in any case, it should not be looked at from a historic angle either for justification or acceptance. Historic justification in the name of the national history of a state, on the basis of the multiple states in the times of the sultanate state, does not give any state any long-lasting historic 'legality'.

On the other hand, historic discovery in the name of the unity at the times of the sultanate state does not take away its legality on the basis of ‘historic right’, ‘Islamic unity’ or ‘Arab unity’.

Historical developments have to be looked at in the context of the second half of the 20th century and its expected directions at the beginning of the 21st century. Such developments must be considered when examining the issue of multiple states, including:

- The emergence of national liberation movements in the third world, specifically the Arab and Islamic world. These movements adopted national or local interfaces in building their ideologies and programs for establishing power, economy and the culture of each state. After the failure of the Egypt-Syria unity attempt and other unity projects, the crisis of including Kuwait in the name of ‘historic

right', and the mistakes of the Syrian administration of Lebanon, it becomes very clear that there is a need for 'unity' alternatives other than the types experienced in Arab history.

- The end of the Cold War, which resulted in a clear consequence, the fall of the 'unity by force' model presented by the Soviet Union and the communism system in Eastern Europe.

- The emergence of an effective, peaceful and successful model of unity in Europe, starting with infrastructure such as transportation, commodities exchange, customs, the movement of people, manpower, currency and rights of travel and residence, to arrive at today's picture of the 'European national' and full unity.

All these developments require reconsideration of the notions of unity and division in our modern life, and eventually a reconsideration of concepts of legality and legitimacy in states' unity or division.

Second, the plurality of religion, parties, ethnicities and ideologies in societies:

· In the past, the sultanate system witnessed a multiplicity of religions, ethnicities and social-cultural backgrounds, and was contained in a type of code of independence between the state and the community. That was made possible through legal and legitimate systems such as sects and the Awqaf system, village or family groups or groups of tribes or clans that had their own local councils, leaders and spokespersons, the craft groups and the Sufis, who had their own leaders and structures.

· Today in the modern democratic states and communities they have witnessed the establishment of political parties, associations, societies, clubs and many influential institutions under what is called ‘civil society’ in the West. This is the opposite of the clerical system of the 19th century or military totalitarianism of the 20th century. Modern society is not a separate or opposing entity to the state, but has relative independence and interacts with the state, as well as the state interacting with it, in a political representative system of power, influence, decision making and distribution of development roles between the state and society.

Reality and political mindset in our Arab Islamic world is suffering from these two problems in general, which are both ineffective. Reference to the multiplicity of the sultanate state is no longer valid, therefore not nowadays legal to be followed and adopted. Neither has reference to the European civil

community, as is the case with some Arabs who are in a position opposing the religious community and abandoning their history and culture, indicative of a straight and sound methodology.

Reviewing history to read today's phenomenon of diversity, unity, division, the sultanate state, the nation state and the Islamic state is, in my opinion, important as an approach and critical viewpoint, not as a reference to imitation or adoption to gain legality or legitimacy. A past experience does not repeat itself in the exactly the same detailed manner. On this basis, we can conclude that the unity experience in the sultanate state cannot be copied at the present time. Its 'unity' is founded on the basis of inclusion and force and intersects today with the inclusive national Western state. This interaction is evident in the Arab national mindset with its 'force-based' projects that do not carry the seeds of development and continuity even if they claim 'legality' on the

basis of history or religion. Such a mindset of inclusion by force has caused hopeless regional wars that hold no bright future. The legality of today's nation states and their legitimacy are not based on historical facts or their ideologies, neither on romantic nationalism nor Islamic inclusiveness but rather on new factors such as development, sovereignty, sharing, democracy and mutual national security, integration of economy, science, education and military powers. Above all, it is the right of Arab citizenship, which is the basis of legality and legitimacy for today and tomorrow.

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### **References:**

- \*) A Tunisian academic living in Brussels**
- \*) A historian and academic from Lebanon**

\*\*\*) Different administrative forms of states  
(translator)

\*\*\*\*) Groups of the same social background.  
This can be translated as *social cohesion, tribalism, clanism, nationalism* (translator)

1. Khaldun, I, Al-Moqadima, p151.

2. Ridha, M R, The Great Caliphate or Imamah, p134.

3. Nassar, N 1980, The Concept of ummah between religion and history, a study of the concept of ummah in Arab Islamic Literature, Dar At Tali'ah, Beirut, pp123-140.

4. Orientalist L. Gardet says. 'What is sure is that many voices in Islam called against "arbitrariness" and refused all rules unless based on the Qur'an and its teachings. And when it comes to the content of government principles, the term "right" that requires defence and protection always and ultimately takes priority.' Gardet, 1 1976. La cite musulmane, vie sociale et politique, 4th ed. Paris, pp38-39.

5. Khaldun, I, op. cit, pp292-293.

6 . Ibid., p156.

7. On this market, refer to Lumbar, M 1977, Islam in its first glory, from the 8th century to the 11th century, trans. Y. Hafidh, Dar At Tali'ah, Beirut, pp111-131.

8. To expand on the subject refer to Kawtharani, W 1990, Al faqeeh wa sultan, a study of two experiences: the Ottoman and the Safavid-Qajaria in Iran, Dar At Tali'ah Beirut.

9. Documents of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, diplomatic report dated 30th May 1929, Vol. 29, Bab Al-Sharq, Syria, Lebanon, p27-28.

10. Ibid., p28.