

# Sources and Types of Legitimacy in the Political Sociology of Max Weber

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Max Weber's works have increasingly been attracting interest in various fields of sociology. In the 1950s, Raymond Aaron commented on the increasing presence of Weber and his works in an article entitled 'Weber is coeval with us',<sup>1</sup> which covered the conference of the German Association of Sociology held on the 100th anniversary of Weber's birth. Aaron wondered, 'What evokes all these emotive debates about Weber though it has been nearly half a century since his death? Is it because of his works or personality?'

Aaron wrote about this conference, which was attended by the most famous European

and Western sociologists, historians and philosophers of the time, including Herbert Marcuse, Talcott Parsons, Herbert Lothy and the young, Jürgen Habermas. The number of Weberians equalled those of Marxians. Americans opened their arms to Weber's works as a science established by a scientist, regardless the political aspect of his personality. On the other hand, many veteran Marxians, even the enlightened ones such as Marcuse, were annoyed by the astonishing correspondence of his sociological predictions and analyses to reality. They were wrathful because these predications and analyses were conducted by a non-Marxian scientist who had never been interested in Marxian ideology, which he sometimes dealt with in a pathological manner.<sup>2</sup>

Today, it has been more than half a century since this outstanding conference and yet Max's works and theses are still at the heart of sociological and political controversy, even more than they were then. Real witnesses to

this controversial presence are the different European publications about Weber, which appear every year.

Political sociology takes up the major part of Max's works, creating ongoing debate and discussion among both students of his work and those who are inspired by his sociological, philosophical and political theses. It is true to say that the contemporary discipline of political sociology is inclusive within the topics and problems discussed by Weber. Examples of such topics are the contemporary state and its relationship with capitalism, bureaucratic administration, forms of electoral politics, patterns of authority and forms of legitimacy. It is not an exaggeration to say that most of the pioneers of sociological and philosophical projects have inescapably passed through the door of Weberian sociology, either inspirationally or critically, to establish their firm bases.<sup>3</sup>

Although Weber's sociological works were scientifically welcomed, along with his theses of capitalism and protestant ethics, his political and sociopolitical ideas were condemned. There are two different teams debating on explaining the big gap between many of the political attitudes that Weber stood for and his concepts of democracy, domination and legitimacy. Grateful to his political (practical) activities, Weber was viewed as a democratic intellectualist for a long time. However, after the publication of Wolfgang Mommsen's<sup>4</sup> book in 1959, it was impossible to turn a blind eye to Weber's overt theoretical attitudes, which many people did not hesitate to interpret as an anti-democratic approach, that is against the concept of human rights. They viewed them as an admirer of the charismatic pattern, which they believed to be almost the same as the totalitarianism **that was** evident in Europe a few years after Weber's death. Such tendencies of Weber's can be clearly seen in the statement when he addressed General Ludendorff in a conversation that took place in 1919. He stated, 'In democracy, the people

choose a leader whom they trust. Then the chosen man says, “Now shut your mouth and obey me.” Neither the people nor the parties are then free to interfere in the leader's business. The people can sit in judgement.’<sup>5</sup>

For most students, the works of Weber the Liberalist, who was calling for strengthening and supporting the power of parliament during the empire, is much less important than Max the reader of Nietzsche, whose first aim was to be ‘the bourgeois Marx’.<sup>6</sup>

The following paragraphs will shed light on the analysis of the definition, sources and types of legitimacy as viewed by Max Weber. The categorisation established by Weber has played an important role in contemporary sociology works. Although this categorisation provides the right source for all discussions of legitimacy in contemporary politics since the 1950s, there is a general impression that before long this will soon turned into a judgement of

failure, especially in terms of its function of analysis. In fact, a successful analysis is a must in any theory of legitimacy as it is responsible for forming a clear standard that enables us to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of authority, and to categorise all forms of ruling systems known in this century. Most importantly, it should entitle us to homogeneously analyse the legitimacy of Liberalistic democracy.<sup>7</sup>

The concept of legitimate domination constitutes the central mainstay of Max's political sociology. For instance, his famous categorisation can be found in five of his works in different contexts, the most important of which is in his huge book, published after his death, entitled *Economy and Society*.<sup>8</sup> In this context, the categorisation functions as an introduction and basis to organise the main chapters analysing bureaucracy, patriarchy, patrimonialism, feudalism and charismatic powers respectively.

In the first volume of a later edition of the same book, the publisher approvingly maintains this categorisation but slightly disagrees with the main sociological statements in its introduction. Again, the categorisation is presented in another book<sup>9</sup> as an introduction to the definitions of common terms used in the study of the world's main religions. The same categorisation is also found in Weber's book *Politics as a Vocation*<sup>10</sup> as an analysis method of the role charisma plays within parties and political elections. Finally, Weber mentions his categorisation in the article, 'The Three Types of Legitimate Domination'<sup>11</sup>, which was published after his death. He briefly aligns the categorisation with the main features of each type.

The intensive focus on this categorisation in Weber's works reflects its importance to him

in his economic, political and religious sociology and concept of domination.<sup>12</sup>

*Sociology of domination: is it the domination of legitimacy or the legitimacy of domination?*

According to Weber, domination is a distinguished form of social action and relationships. It is a relationship of leadership and obedience by which the people are subjected to a leadership under which they shall obey orders regardless their contents.<sup>13</sup> To Weber, it was a question of some people having distinguished characteristics that enable them to be in a position of superiority over the others by one form or another. He poses different questions to clarify this idea as follows:

- What are the personal characteristics that the people who order or the people who obey the orders have, which gradually make it



possible to form a social relationship in all cases?

- What are the historical, cultural, political, social and economic conditions that make it easy or difficult to form such a relationship?

- What are the results of this social relationship at all levels of social reality?

To answer these questions, Weber worked on improving a system that included three central concepts: power, domination and obedience,<sup>14</sup> expressed as follows:

*Power is the chance that an individual has, in a social relationship, by which he can impose his own will even against the*

*resistance of others regardless on which this chance is based. We use the term domination to describe every ruling system that could provide the chance to achieve the obedience of a certain people. We mean by obedience the chance to find a rapid and automatic obedience from a number of certain people according to a certain sequence.*<sup>15</sup>

Weber did not focus on clarifying and analysing the concepts of power and obedience but instead mentioned the concept of power in relationship to economy, or the concept of class, parties or rule. Similarly, he did not discuss the concept of power except for its relationship to the military or religion.<sup>16</sup> His scientific and political interest was focused on the phenomenon of domination since it forms the core of the social relationship; there is domination willingness on one hand, and obedience and compliance willingness on the other.

Weber preferred to use the term 'domination' rather than 'power' or 'authority', which he considered a vague concept. Furthermore, he believed that domination is not necessarily political, except if there is a group of people somewhere where affairs are ruled and managed by a certain group of people who are assigned to that role in particular. Thus, domination practiced by the head of a household is not political, firstly because it is practiced over a limited number of people, and secondly because it is not supported by an administrative authority that executes orders.

On the other hand, according to Weber, casual temporary domination achieved by force, or a relationship of force, is not significant to sociology. In contrast, domination in his context is the one that is characterised by stability and continuity, which makes it understandable and interpretable. In other words, the concept of domination is applicable when based on the

legitimacy of obedience derived from belonging and conviction rather than obedience based on fear. In this context, Weber is faithful to his method of comprehension, which he generally uses in his sociology. Within his realisation, Weber tries to describe those who accept domination. He focuses mostly on comprehending these self-made descriptions of the two most important social actors rather than describing real outer representations that are so-called neutral and objective. In fact, Legitimacy is the faith in the self-value or the view towards the social system<sup>17</sup> in which the subordinates live. Thus, subordinate people add a new meaning to the domination they are subjected to. Domination should not be a result of a habit or instrumental rationalisation, but instead it should be initially desirable by subordinates, otherwise the social system is likely to collapse at any moment. This meaning is not represented in utilitarianism as the latter is likely to collapse as soon wealth is distributed, and neither is it represented in the concept of habit as it is changeable, leading to a unstable

system. Accordingly, it is, necessarily, that subordinates believe in the legitimacy of a certain system. Weber maintains,

*The system that is respected for rational reasons is generally less stable than the one that is respected for habitual reasons. That is essentially because of the routine features of human behaviour. In fact, habits are the most common behaviour among humans; however, a habit-based system is less stable compared to a system that is based on the attraction of idealism and necessity, namely legitimacy.<sup>18</sup>*

In the third chapter, ‘Sociology Levels’, of the book *Economy and Society*, under the title, ‘Types of Domination’, Max tries to differentiate between the types and forms of domination.

After a comprehensive analysis, Weber concludes that there are various explanations

for subordination and obedience towards claimed dominations, ranging from a 'dull habit' to more rational explanations. However, what is common among these explanations is that there is always a minimum level of willingness to obey, namely there is always a personal interest (internal or external) behind obedience.<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, the concept of domination cannot be applied to unequal economic relationships. The ability of some people to manipulate economic conditions to influence and direct social factors cannot be compared to the relationships of authority. Weber states,

*Using the term domination to describe an economical power, based on using monopolization, which strengthens the ability to impose certain exchange conditions on the partners, is almost the same as using the term domination to describe the effect of winning in*

*love, sport, speech or any other kind of contest.*<sup>20</sup>

Weber begins by saying that domination is a real phenomenon and not an ideal consideration. It is not a legal or ideological finding that can be drawn from a particular value or standard, in contrast, it actually exists. Namely, it exists as long there is a ruling authority that makes laws that are followed by a wide range of people.

Weber refuses any value-based or standard-based explanation for domination. He decides that any execution of an order should be explained by the definition he mentioned. However, he believes that the result, namely executing the order, is not enough to understand the various reasons behind this relationship, starting with issuing the order and ending with its execution.

To maintain his chance of executing his orders by subordinates, the dominant person usually needs 'an administrative authority'. The patterns that connect the dominant person with his subordinates vary according to social action patterns defined by Weber as follows:21

1- The traditional action imposed by inherited customs, traditions and ideologies, which gradually turn into those of a fixed nature. The actor here is neither led for a value or purpose nor influenced by an emotion; instead he reacts to fixed instructions found in his practical life.

2- The effective (emotional) action that is induced by a conscious state or mood of the person at a certain moment, such as when a mother hits her son in anger. Another example is when a soccer player loses his temper and kicks another player at the end of the game. Such actions cannot be connected to a particular purpose or value as they are



emotional reactions carried out under certain circumstances.

3- The instrumental or purposeful social action is, according to Raymond Aaron, identical to the logical action described by Barito.<sup>22</sup> It is the action where a social actor is well aware of the purpose and the reasons leading to it, such as an engineer trying to build a tunnel or a stockholder seeking profit.

4- The value rational act connected to a value, such as a person defending his home with his life, or a captain who prefers to go down with his ship rather than surviving without it because he believes that it is shameful to do so. Such actions are rational because people are faithful to the concept of honour or honest morality without achieving a certain goal.

When the relationship between the dominant person and the administrative authority is purposefully materialistic and rational, it results in unstable domination. Accordingly, sometimes emotional and rational values are added to such a relationship. However, it is still not enough to establish a firm basis for domination even when the relationship includes interest and connections based on a purpose, value and emotion. In such case, there is a stronger factor that can be added, which is 'the belief in legitimacy'.

It is not an exaggeration to say that Weber's political sociology is not intended in the domination of legitimacy, which is an obscure concept to the later sociological and political studies, rather than how to 'legitimise' all forms of domination known across human history.

*The belief of the subordinates is the first source of legitimacy:*

Weber believes that experience proves that having more chances to continue domination does not depend on materialistic, emotional or value-based rational reasons. Domination mostly seeks to educate people and make them believe in its legitimacy. Consequently, and according to Weber, it is appropriate to differentiate between patterns of legitimacy according to patterns of domination.

This idea views domination as a distinguished form of social actions and relationships. Social action adopts different directions and approaches. It is important to mention that Weber's view towards legitimacy and legitimisation was introduced in a wider and more comprehensive context, namely within his research of domination patterns and

bases. His writing about legitimacy was only an explanatory tool to describe patterns of domination and legitimate domination in particular.

The main challenge in the political sociology of Weber is legitimate domination and not the concept of legitimacy itself. According to the Canadian sociologist Laurence McFalls, Weber did not use terms such as legitimate\illegitimate\* except in a narrow range of circumstances, either in his theoretical writings or debates.<sup>23</sup> When he used these terms, he used them in contexts that are different from the ones known later on in the political discipline.

In the 'Illegitimate Domination' chapter in his book *Economy and Society*, Weber compares cities of the Middle Ages to ancient cities. He concludes that the important role

played by the cities of the Middle Ages in the transformation to the 'electional form of cities' at the level of its leadership, 'paving the way for the emergence of the contemporary concept of the city as an open company that is owned by all individuals.' Unlike what some people think about him, Weber does not legitimise or discuss a form of domination based on violence or revolution, instead he discusses a new form of domination that contrasts to the old kinds based on the conventional, aristocratic and religious authority. He describes municipal authorities in all Italian cities at the beginning of the 14th century, established by the Italian Pabolo\*, as the first common politics that were consciously illegitimate and non-revolutionary (he aimed, by using the term 'illegitimate', to describe a form of domination that consciously breaks off the demand for traditional domination). The legitimacy of the new domination does not exist without the existence of another that claims to be legitimate. This means that Weber viewed legitimacy and illegitimacy as relative

standardised concepts, namely they evaluate judgements and are not credible analysed facts.<sup>24</sup> However, for some political sciences, it is usual to talk about the legitimacy of a political system as an actual feature where its absence leads necessarily to a ‘legitimacy crisis’. Thus, the patterns of legitimacy correspond to social actions,<sup>25</sup> as stated by Weber in his book *Economy and Society*. He mentions three types of legitimate domination — traditional, rational and charismatic.

Traditional domination is buttressed by continuous belief in the sacred nature of traditions and customs held in the memory of the individual, obliging him to show respect towards them. In a society where relationships are personal and interconnected because of common beliefs, we find that constancy is preferable to renewal. Accordingly, upon these traditions and customs, respecting the social arrangements becomes an instrument of maintaining and guaranteeing domination. Therefore, each ruling system, that owns such

fixed customs along with common beliefs, increasingly demands domination until it becomes a kind of natural domination whose foundations and roots are not in doubt.

Rational domination is based on the belief of the legitimacy of the law that is related to the concept of society built on contraction and equality between its members. This kind of domination is characterised by its strong institutional nature and bureaucracy. Public and impersonal rules are the first priority, and political employment is carried out according to the level of competence, not favoritism and family relationships. In such domination, each dominant person and his subordinates are equally led by rational behaviour\*, namely, they follow a rational disciplinary path in order to achieve their goals.

Charismatic domination is located at a high level of effectiveness (emotion). According to Weber, the power of dominant people over

their subordinates is based on ‘an emotional group’ and unusual sacred subjugation by the subordinates towards the heroic, religious, oratorical and exceptional merits of a particular person. A democratic or traditional leader, if he wants to impose his self, can depend on voluntary ‘self-donation’, which drives his subordinates to an absolute dedication motivated by enthusiasm or necessity. Charismatic domination uses all possible tools and methods to charm subordinates through the personality of the dominant person, which affects, confusingly, two other types of domination: the traditional and the rational. For example, a religious or traditional leadership based on traditional domination can be turned into charismatic leadership concealing traditional legitimacy to the advantage of charismatic legitimacy. Also, a democratic leadership may shift into an electoral system suspending all current legal rules.



More importantly is that these three types of domination cannot establish their legitimacy by materialistic external bases only. Instead, they should have the strong belief of subordinates in their legitimacy. When theorising the problem of legitimacy, Weber was thinking of an incentive for the social shift based on a self-intentional logic. Weber maintains,<sup>26</sup>

*Experience proves that there is not any domination that is exclusively and voluntarily dependant on obsolete materialistic emotional or rational motives to maintain its continuity. In contrast, all types of domination seek to make their people believe in their legitimacy.<sup>27</sup>*

However, this does not exclude other motives, such as materialistic ones that can be the reason behind the emergence of some forms of domination. This is obviously represented when Weber relates the intensive

rise of bureaucracy in the USA with external factors ignoring the concept of legitimacy based on self-belief.<sup>28</sup> In fact, such ideas stated by Weber are behind the obscure and inhomogeneous nature of his political sociology.

On the other hand, it is difficult to clarify the real and actual motives for such belief as the real motives for obedience are multiple. However, this mutability has no sociological meaning, namely the sociological understanding does not require necessarily ‘reviving or restructuring the actual motives of a certain social action.’<sup>29</sup>

Searching for legitimacy is an endless process and Weber was not interested in figuring out whether a claim of legitimacy is effective in maintaining the continuity of domination or not. Instead, he was interested in knowing ‘how’ the form of such a claim could contribute in forming and organising

relationships within this domination. This goal led Weber to establishing his categorisation of domination, including three abstract forms that a claim of domination can take.

Weber's analysis indicates that there is no self-sufficiency in the three forms of legitimacy. For instance, in traditional domination, the dominant person claims that he represents a principle derived from his seniority. Similarly, the charismatic dominant claims that he represents a principle breaking off from the past that is derived from his exceptional personality. Rational domination is dependant on a group of principles accepted by everyone, and claims that it is superior to all.

Therefore, it is unacceptable to talk about traditional, charismatic or rational domination as a reality. The royal system, based on inherited legitimacy cannot dispense with the need of 'summoning' 'the exceptional

characteristics' of the king or rationalising the administrative leadership, otherwise it will be irrational, similar to rationalised bureaucracy, which soon shifts into a rigid convention in the absence of charismatic motives. Likely, if the administrators of a revolutionary system continue to work for and under politics without rationalisation, their system will soon fall into chaos.

There is a continuous shift of forms of legitimacy from one to another, and what Weber was interested in was to understand the variable forms of legitimacy in order to describe the disturbance raised in each and the tension found between each of them. This is obvious in his analysis of the Reich system in the Geom II era, which was in its way to collapsing. According to Laurence McFalls in one of his articles, Weber, astonishingly, did not mention that this system was illegitimate though he had radically criticised it previously. This was because Weber did not value the

standard of legitimate\illegitimate in his analysis.

*Consequences of the charismatic form and criticism on Weber's political sociology:*

The concept of legitimacy or legitimate domination has been intensively criticised starting from the paradox of this complex notion, combining domination and legitimacy into one concept, which is far from the homogenous description of the social phenomena or, more precisely, in the form of such social phenomena. The criticism also includes the connection between the concept of legitimacy and the self-belief of the social actors, regardless of the objective and legal limitations. Also, there has been criticism about the exaggerated psychological description of the subordinates' acceptance of domination, as if this acceptance is a legitimisation for the authority and even more powerful than it.

There may be other reasons that caused this intense criticism against the legitimate domination concept. It may be the ideological use, if not exploitation, of the concept after Weber's death. Many people believe that the 14th June 1920, the date of Weber's death, was the starting point of Weber's achievements.<sup>30</sup> Various readings, especially the ones conducted in the Weimar Republic, have used many Weberian concepts, including legitimate domination, charismatic and democratic elections for professional and political purposes or to promote their theses, which avoided explaining sociologically and legally the historical event of Weber's death.<sup>31</sup> An example of such readings is Hans Kelsen's, which concluded in a paradox that Weber is one of the main theorists of democracy. Carl Schmitt pushed the Weberian charismatic form to the presidential totalitarianism and Richa Tomma's writing, which overtly interpreted the Weberian statements by the electoral and

aristocratic democracy and the domination of the best within such a system.<sup>32</sup>

There is no doubt that Weber's obscure concepts, complicated categorisation and political and intellectual hesitation towards some concepts have played an important role in such ideological and political exploitation of his sociological and political theses. Above all, it is impossible to ignore his political involvement and the overlap of his professional ambition with his theoretical tendencies that show an unclear attitude towards liberalism and democracy. Weber seems to be tending toward a parliamentary democracy headed by a strong leader who has a charismatic privilege, enabling him to reduce the parliamentary disputes. Weber was against the obsolete parliamentary system, which was at that time represented in the Third Republic. In 1918, he announced, in public, 'The parliamentary system and its factional disputes can be avoided if the executive board unifying the Reich is under the power of a leader

elected by the whole nation.’ By his statement, Weber hoped to see ‘a leader supported by the revolutionary legitimacy of public elections.’<sup>33</sup> His tendency was toward what he called election democracy, in which the leader, through his charisma, is superior to the authority of the parliament.

In our point of view, it is an underestimation to consider Weberian political sociology as a theory similar to the anti-democracy theories of the 19th century. His analysis of the oligarchic tendencies of the democratic systems and organisations is confused with the internal paradoxes of the contemporary principles of legitimacy. Therefore, it is important to distinguish, within his sociological domination, between what is based on analysis of contemporary forms and what is based on the reconstruction of the social conflict dynamism. There should never be an approximation or comparison between this Weberian work and the totalitarianism form.<sup>34</sup> It is simply because totalitarianism,



along with the Soviet Union, was subsequently experienced by Germany and Italy prior to the Second World War. In fact, this pattern was not even seen on the sociological horizon at that time.

However, as Mommsen says,<sup>35</sup> the constitution of the fifth Republic under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle may be considered the closest form to the aims of electoral democracy as stated by Weber. If Weber were still alive in 1933, he might actually realise the dramatic consequences of charismatic domination for which he longed.

## References

**\*) A Tunisian academic living in Brussels**

1. Aron, R 1967, *Les étapes de la pensée sociologique*, Edition Gallimard, Paris, p564.

2. For more information about this conference, refer to the above mention article.

3. For instance, the Frankfurt School viewed Weber's works as the standard of the negative consequences of contemporary rationalisation. It also denied all works conducted by Jürgen Habermas, Carl Schmitt and Talcott Parsons who translated Weber's works into English.

4. Mommsen, W 1986, 'Max Weber et la politique allemande 1890-1920', coll., *Sociologie*, Puf, Paris.

5. Weber, M 1988, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, Tübingen, p499.

6. Raynaud, P, *Max Weber et les dilemmes de la raison moderne*, Presses Universitaires de France, p158.

7. Beetham, D, 1995, 'Max Weber et la légitimité politique', *Revue européenne des sciences sociales*, Vol. XXXIII, N°101, pp 11-22.

8. Mohr, J C B, *Wirtschaft und gesellschaft*, Tübingen. In this article we referred to the original

German and its French translation entitled *Economie et Société*, 1995, Pocket, Paris.

9. Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligion.

10. Politik als Beruf.

11. Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft.

12. Herrschaft.

13. Mohr J C B, op. cit., p 549.

14. Kaesler, D c1996, *Max Weber: sa vie, son oeuvre, son influence*, Fayard, Paris, p187.

15. *Wirtschaft und gesellschaft*, op. cit., p28.

16. Kaesler, D, loc. cit.

\*Territorialität/Territorialité

17. Weber defines the social system as follows, ‘a content indicating a social relationship where

action is directed by electable principles.’

Weber, M 1995. ‘Les concepts fondamentaux de la

sociologie’, *Economie et Société*, Vol. 1, Plon, Paris, p65.

18. Weber, M, ibid. p65.

19. Kaesler, D, op. cit., p188.

20. Weber, M, op cit., p286.

21. Arond, R 1967, *Les étapes de la pensée sociologique*, Edition Gallimard, Paris, p500.

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worked hard on categorising the phenomena by selecting what he called the pure patterns

that he believed to be the only method that allows the respect of the endless mutability of values directing sociologists' research. The ideal or pure pattern is a representation of reality

therefore it is necessarily partial or biased. For example, the researcher can be biased towards

certain variables over another ones which he intends to exclude from his research. See,

Grawitz, M 1993, *Méthodes des sciences sociales*, Précis Dalloz. p101.

22. *ibid.*, p500.

23. Weber, M, *op. cit.*, p185.

\*legitim/nicht legitim.

24. McFalls, L, 'L'Etat bâtard: illégitimité et légitimation chez Max Weber', *La légitimité de*

*l'Etat et du droit Autour de Max Weber,  
sous la direction de Michel Coutu et Guy  
Rocher,*

L.G.D.J e les Presses de l'Université Laval

\* Popolo. Popolo is a term used for some of the inhabitants of Italian municipalities between the

12th-14th centuries that did not belong to the noble class. It included merchants who traded in

the thriving Italian cities between the 11th-14th centuries.

\* Zweckrational

25. Weber, M, op. cit., p285.

In fact, the three types of social actions do not all correspond to the three types of domination. There is a type of social action that Weber did not correspond to legitimacy.

On the other hand, there are three types of legitimacy that correspond to four types of domination. This controversial point provoked different explanations, for instance, Raymond Aaron stated that this difference was because of Weber's vague concepts. He proved his idea by the different categorisation mentioned by Weber in another context of legitimate systems corresponding to the three types of social actions. However, Philip Rhino believed that these two categorisations are not identical, namely the first one views legitimacy from the dominants person's point of view while the second one views legitimacy from the subordinates' point of view. Accordingly, rational legitimacy in Weber's view corresponds to the two types of rational action related to both a value and purpose. (See, Raymond Aaron's book mentioned above, p555 and Philip Rhino's book previously mentioned, pp158-159).

26. Bourdieu takes into consideration self-logic but at the same time he reduces the intensity of

intention through his theory, the Habitus.

27. Weber, M, op. cit., pp544-545. German version.

28. Weber explains the intensive rise of bureaucracy as being ‘mostly established with the least

cost’ and ‘as the main reason for the development of Patriarch is its technical superiority over

other types of organization.’ *Economy and Society*.

29. Weber, M, loc. cit.



30. Herrera, C M, 'Comment assumer l'héritage wébérien sous Weimar Légitimité, démocratie,

changement social', *La légitimité de l'Etat et du droit Autour de Max Weber, sous la*

*direction de Michel Coutu et Guy Rocher.*  
L.G.D.J e les Presses de l'Université Laval,  
p221.

31. Carlos Michael Herara says, 'Absorbing Weber's ideas under the Weimar Republic was a

political pet regarding the state theory', *ibid.*  
p214.

32. Review a different analysis for a different form of studies of Weber's political works,  
*ibid.*,

p236-221.

33. Mommsen, W, op. cit., p430.

34. Actually, many writers followed this step and made a strong connection between the

Weberian concept of charisma and the emergence of Adolph Hitler, such as Auto Colrouter

and Carl Lopheth. *ibid.*, pp510-511.

35. *ibid.*, pp512-513.