

The Sociology of Nomads and Iraqi Society: with Specific Reference to Ali Al-Wardi and Ibn Khaldun

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Countries that are the home of too many tribes can rarely be governed by a state.

Chieftainship is in tribal affiliations.

Ibn Khaldun

I

Nomadism is fading out on the global arena but is still deeply rooted and persistent in Iraqi society, recalling to memory a vivid image of past clan coherence in ties of kinship and chieftainship, and recalling Ibn Khaldun's famous saying, 'The key to chieftainship is tribal affiliation.'

Dr. Ali Al-Wardi, an Iraqi sociologist, tried for decades to revisit Khaldun's rule in light of present Iraq. His book, *Sociological Glimpses on the History of Modern Iraq*, attempts to reveal the similarities and differences between present and past sociological approaches.

II

Dr. Al-Wardi says he approaches Iraqi society from the perspective of Ibn Khaldun's thoughts of nomadism vs. urbanism, a conflict that dates back, according to him, to antiquity(1). His claim is that the desert produces nomadism and green lands produce urbanism, and both these extremes are still in constant conflict. But, the Khaldunian concept of the eternal conflict, Al-Wardi says, unfolds into a unipolar hegemony: the nomadic spirit prevails and also reaches out to the city. Al-Wardi, in other words, topples the Khaldunian concept with some reasonable arguments that we will discuss. In fact, the Khaldunian cycle is not only closed but also has defined terms.

III

The cycle begins with the well-knitted nomadic group seizing power by making use of all types of kinship loyalty (tribalism) in a given city or urban area. The city cannot respond to this nomadic invasion by going to extremes and using violence, for courage and arms are not the characteristics of a city, which is usually stable and self-reliant on subsistence. The response, however, comes in the form of de-nomadising a nomad by integrating him into the city, which results in cutting off his ties with his clan by indulging him in a world of wealth and luxury, and, by so doing imposes a penalty as it paves the way to his demise as a ruler. And, here begins a new cycle.

This interaction between the two adversaries is marked with a weaker position of the city vis-à-vis the desert in terms of handling violence, though the city is still in a better

position as regards the regulation of wealth and welfare organisations. Each party uses its available means to fight the other in this struggle.

IV

The antonym nature of nomadism and urbanism, for Ibn Khaldun, involves values, organizations, production, psychology and ethics. They are two totally opposite realms.

Nomadism	Urbanism
- Closer to godliness	- Far away from godliness
- Closer to courage	- Far away from courage
- All are armed	- none are armed (except the ruler's soldiery)
- Everybody is in charge of	- Ruler is charged with

defending property	defence of property and souls.
- Courage	- Protect themselves with fences
- Freemen without fences	- Menacing
- Deterrence is in conviction	- Deterrence in the city is handled through violence
- Power of leadership is in the respect of the elderly	- Ruler's power resides in scare tactics
- Courage and valour are overarching traits	- Scare tactics minimises the valour of urban people(2)

V

The nomad-urban extremes, according to Ibn Khaldun, are a dynamic process whereby

nomadism is an active/passive agent. Nomads tend to seize the urban because its tempting wealth cannot be resisted, and thus are trapped into the accession of power, which consecutively leads to luxury, then to loss of tribalism and eventually to loss of power. The cycle lasts for three generations, each of which lasts for forty years. The total age of power thus lasts for a hundred and twenty years.

‘Countries that are the home of too many tribes can rarely be governed by a state,’ remarks Ibn Khaldun, pointing out as an example the situation in Africa and the Maghreb countries that has persisted since the rise of Islam because of the overwhelming tribalism prevailing there. The case was not the same, he adds, in Iraq and Greater Syria, which fell under the protectorates of Persia and Byzantium, and both were city-states’ (3).

It is here inevitable to ask why the Arab region, extending from Northern Africa through the Mashreq up till to the Arabian Peninsula, was marked with a conflict affiliated with religious designs, spreading out from the Desert, where it first originated, to the Urban.?

There have been many attempts by modern sociologists to answer that this question with their benchmarks established based on Ibn Khaldoun's thoughts, and thus they started to attribute that conflict to a state of imbalance between agriculturism and pastoralism, with the latter outweighing the former(5). This attribution, however, is almost hazy because pastoralism, as is commonly known, by its very nature encourages by nature the basic pre-technological military faculties like: such as swift movement, dynamism, and the ability to flee, either to avert a fight at all completely or to avert a fight at an inappropriate time. The pastoralist needs not produce any weaponry, neither does he need to live behind

fortified fences. In fact, he carries arms wherever he goes and keeps arms there wherever he is settled down.

"There are no people of the noble class, as in feudal Europe, who are specialized specialised in military arts. Here all people (nomads) hold arms, and no powerful militia is there to disarm them. Even if they had chiefs, those had no power at all in disarming the tribe, if at all they showed any desire to do so(5). A famous relevant excerpt that is relevant to this is quoted from a work of by Gellner saying that the prevalence of nomadism in North Africa and lack of it on the opposite coasts of European opposite coasts is due to the relative disparity in the status of pastoral economy and agricultural economy in the two respective communities, and hence the domination of "tribalism" and the "feudal choice" on the two sides respectively as a solution for the regulation of arms, which is much easier to be handled in stable agricultural communities (lands are fixed and do not move from one

place to another) than in nomads' ever-moving ones.

Nomadic tribes, whose military strength is built particularly on the male adults, particularly, take advantage over other communities thanks due to its their superior portion of military share might, which makes it them, in this sense, a military gathering force. As Gellner views it, the first condition for of military life is mobility, or, more precisely, the ability to flee, and this highlights the supreme dynamism of pastoral tribes, that who are able to take the flight by using their own wealth, i.e. camels, horses and light chattels. By the same token, they strengthen their subsistence by developing their abilities to launch raids on nomadic cattle and also by natural reproduction(6).

The source of power of nomads being a military group force is coupled with coherence of its members because of through blood ties.

Equating civilization with the Khaldounian urbanism was impossible to achieve in the agricultural reign without a centralized authority (Reign). Likewise, it is impossible to have reign rule without tribalism as the latter regulates coercion or (regulated violence that is able to hold retain rule. reign). In this sense, nomadism does not only mark the inception of civilization (i.e. a change of the life of nomads into settlement) but it also constitutes a basic condition for its subsistence, in a similar manner to the fact that civilization is a pre-requisite for the break-up of kinship-based coherence, i.e. the the dissolution of the Khaldounian tribalism.

In essence, Ibn Khaldoun's sociological thoughts are based on his vision of for the human sociological condition, stated as: pre-requisites for the rise of a civilization that is completely opposite to those pre-requisites of tribal solidarity.(7) Cohabitation between tribes and cities continued during the agricultural era in a state of troubled balance,

with cities unable to control the Deserts. The relative stability of that relationship was the reason why that Ibn Khaldoun envisaged an inescapable eternal phenomenon. The Ottoman State, as a matter of fact, was the first state during the Islamic/agricultural era to breach the Khaldounian rule concept of the Reign Rule Cycle.

The Ottomans with all their tribes, nomads and pastoralists alike, cohesive with through their tribal ties, seized reign rule in the first generation, consistently with the Khaldounian's analysis,, and in consistencet with the same Khaldounian model, the second generation monopolized Reignrule.

However, the Ottoman power lasted three times the period anticipated by Ibn Khaldoun, i.e. the three- generation period of 120 a hundred and twenty years. The Ottomans, moreover, were not defeated by the desert

people but their doom came at the hands of a strong industrial power: Europe.

The Ottoman's deviation of from the Khaldounian rule cannot be explained in military terms, for the Ottomans, just like other nations, including pioneering Arab Muslims and, the later the Abbasids, originated from warring pastoral tribes including the Buyids and Saljuqs. . Once Reign rule is was established and monopolizedmonopolised, it was necessary to segregate military aristocracy from tribalism and kinship. . In other words, the Sultan had to create a military system made up of slaves, including non-Muslims, and what this meansmeaning is that violence as a system is was alien from the ruler's tribe and the society in general. . Its very existence is was owed to its "“buyer”".

Such a sequence took place before during the Abbasid reign, when an army of ethnic

Turkish soldiers were formed and segregated from the population. . The Abbasids' rule, however, fell at the hands of the Deylamites, as Ibn Khaldoun(8) says states, while this was not the case with the Ottomans, even though the nomadic tribe continued to exist as ever before.

VII

Ali Al-Wardi addresses asserts that the nomadismn issue in that that period that constituted an irregularity of the Khaldounian rule, for the conflict between nomadism and urbanizationsation, in both its value and military terms, is still continuing if we take into consideration tribes' continuous raids launched at the urban cities, including Baghdad, and continuous tribal rebellions, aside apart from the actual warning influence of tribes making it almost impossible to trade, an important indicator of the balance between the urban and the rural(9).

However, these examples are occasional "‘tempests storms in a teapot"teacup’, so to speak, for none has ever been a real threat to the central authority, not to mention toppling it as happened in the days of Ibn Khaldoun. . This can be attributed to the fact that the Ottoman days era saw the rise of weapons using the gunpowder, weapons that which reversed the relationship between the city and the desert and halted the Khadlounian cycle, just as it changed the relationship between the city and the noblemen's fortresses in Europe.

Al-Wardi's concept of the civilization/nomadism dichotomy is not the same here as the Khaldounian polarism, but it is exactly the very opposite. Nomadism here is a system of values and a form of structure that prevails over the society and moves on into the city, not to be dissolved therewith but to seek endurance in the form of: vengeance, invasion,, washing offriding of dishonour, and confinement to local tribalism

(fanaticism to the city, the sect or the neighbourhood).

Al-Wardi reformulates the Khaldoun nomadic/urbanization struggle as a freak of modern-traditional civilization, which, according to him, nonetheless, results not from the nomadic-urban break-up of the society, but from the society's interaction with the Western civilization(10).

The Khaldounian society was, thus, trapped between a pre-urbanisation desolation and its own image. . The new society, which Al-Wardi tries to reproduce from a Khaldounian perspective, however, is confused between its already breaking updisappearing self-traditional civilization and the civilization of the others that has found its way into through fortified fences. This unique composition has been addressed by a methodological correlation in which Al-Wardi combined the Khaldounian concepts of sociology with those

of the Western modern thoughts, from in particular psycho-sociology and modernisationsation theoriesy in particular(11).

VIII

Basing Based on a relative-positive methodology, Al-Wardi proceeds into the induction of sociological components of the Iraqi society from a comprehensive historical comprehensive reading that covers the Ottoman reign in throughoutall Iraq.

This choice draws our attention to a very significant point: that is, the historical processes constituting the social "ego" and the value system attached to it, its self-esteem, cultural systems and social structures (including, for example, mMullahs, Effendis effendis (or the nobility), the Sufist groups, tribes, etc.) are by no means infinite, and that

the communal memory in that age does not last for more than a few centuries.

Al-Wardi identifies two important features in Iraq: a curbing of the nomadic expansion, and the Ottoman-Safavid(12) struggle with the consequences of "“a severe sectarian conflict between Shi’ites and Sunni Muslims.””

Al-Wardi stresses, without relying on clear analogies, that the nomadic expansion during the Ottoman reign, which was the last, was "“much more forceful than that of any preceding reign””, which he attributes to successions of conquests (see: Wars) and halting of urbanizationsation, as a result of which, "“city dwellers resorted to tribalism and nomadic values to protect themselves and their properties, just as smaller tribes had to come together into a coalition of bigger tribes.””(13)

In other words, the growth of nomadism and/or the hegemony of the nomadic values are in direct proportion to the weakness of both the central state and the city-states.

While the tribe, by virtue of its very structure, produces its self-defence mechanisms, the urban cities use fences and locked doors in neighborhoods locked doors, headed by young bullies (just like the Egyptian futuwa or the Lebanese qabaday)(14) to protect themselves from external and internal threats respectively. The cohesive relations (tribal ties) presented by Al-Wardi here are very factual though totally contradictory to the coherence factors envisaged by Ibn Khaldoun.

IX

Ibn Khaldun's main obsession, even concern, is nomadic coherence. He is almost depressed by the dissolution of such coherence in urban cities, which, according to him,, are

terminators of nomadic coherence. . He never envisages any other tie than kinship to form the main block in building human association. In this way, as Genllner notices, his premises are the opposite of Durkheim's, who was, in turn, concerned with the study of human coherence and integrity throughout his life, and thus he distinguished two types of solidarity, arguing that those ties based on kinship fall under "weak mechanical solidarity" and those ties based on the modern division of labour and interrelationships under "biological solidarity". . The first former is based on functional resemblance and simple division of labour, and thus everything is the same, while the latter is based on functional differentiation and complex division of labour with consequent mutual interdependence. . Regardless of the nature of each type of solidarity, the coherence factors of the modern city, modern coherence factors for Durkheim, are stronger than the traditional old ones(15).

Apparently, Ali Al-Wardi, in his approach to the Ottoman Iraq, makes no distinction between the various forms of nomadic and civil coherence. He does not seem to consider the urban a terminator of tribalism but, rather, he considers its possible possibility for the movement of the latter into the urban as a factor of solidarity among urban groups. There are here (1) a nomadism based on tribalism or (kinship coherence,) and (2) urbanization, that is manifested in three graduated levels, i.e. the neighbourhood, city tribalism, and sectarianism.

Al-Wardi approaches these types of coherence from a perspective of an arithmetical consensus perspective without giving much attention to its contents, and tribalism for him seems to be a fait accompli. But, the spirit of urbanism spirit in its three forms can be attributed to an external threat, i.e. an aggression launched against the city or the members of a sect members. Thus, coherence factors, according to him are not structural but

rather external. . This interpretation looks quite narrow, for the urban groups have been tantamount to organisations with full social, economic, cultural and political functions, not to mention its "“military function”" that refers to self self-defense defence against external threats. . It can hardly be perceived that the relationship system that we call "“tribalism”" or "“coherence”" cannot be a result of one function that has to do with external threats, no matter how important this function is important.

The main reason for this deficient analysis is due to Al-Wardi's concern with about the shaping of the forms of this narrow coherence in a segmentary segmented way when addressing ideological myths, be they nationalistic ones that believe in the eternity of "“the sense of belonging to the nation”", or the narrow historical beliefs that neglect all types of collective consciousness, that which is different from class consciousness(16). Of course, emphasis on the existence of collective

consciousness and denial of the social hierarchy are two different things,, while we can envisage a graduated system of values that reflect and protect that hierarchy in the heart of "“collective consciousness”” (tribal, neighbourhood or sectarian) a graduated system of values that reflect and protect that hierarchy.

The existence of tribalism, parentalism and equalisation in the heart of the tribe does not deny the fact that tribes vary from one another in professions, ie.: tradetrading, camel raising, agriculture, and handicrafts. . Here, trade arises almost as holy, while camel raisers consider themselves superior to "sheep raiserss", who, in turn, look down at on farmers, and rice growers look down at on vegetable growers, who, in turn, disdain the mere thinking of practicing handicrafts, the basest of all.

This graduated hierarchy of values/professions, that look external, ie. That governs inter-tribal relationships, is the old-world hierarchy. . Another type of hierarchy There can be seen another type of hierarchy in the cities: - nobles, masters, trade chiefs, class chiefs, then and, finally, laymen. . It seems that the more non-productive a the social function of groups or individuals is, the better and the higher. , and The closer the body is to it is to physically touching of the body to living things, the baser.

The function/profession is constant and closed, which is the key for to its eternity. . It moves on from one generation to another with constant professionalism and development of the closed guilds develop their own professionalism in religious studies, trade and handicraft as well. Guilds... This career is marked by a special culture (religion or cult), as whenfor example when a cultural sign becomes an indicator of a career, such as the

(attachment of goldsmithery to the Sabi'ites, or banking to Jews.)

Al-Wardi has presented an innovative account on of some of these social elements, but he has, unfortunately, ignored the Ssufist groups with their own multi-functions and hierarchies (from the Qutub to the Mureed), as he ignored the means of dissolution of these elements(17), i.e. the end of the old division of labour (categorised in classesclosed in classes) and the emergence of the division of open labour division (the capitalist) with the first former being attached to tribalism and self-generating groups, and the latter attached to individuals organised in new groups, such as (parties, professional professions or trade unions, etc.)

X

From Old Tribalism to Neo-tribalism

Al-Wardi makes creates a sociological precedence by tracing back the dissolving of smaller identities and the formation of the bigger Iraqi identity to the year 1920, which saw the commingling of old consciousness with the new one, looting with mutiny, and anarchism with revolution. . Al-Wardi believes the British have failed in two things: firstly, in their intervention with the natural tribal representation by replacing it with the power of administrative appointments and authority,; and, secondly, in attracting the intelligentsia of the then society of the time, ie.: the mMullahs and the eEffendis(18), the former for the prestigious status they have enjoy as people of with religious knowledge, and the latter for their modern political culture.

Al-Wardi stresses that those two categories of knowledgeable people, are more able to incite poets and writers, for the eEffendis are good readers of newspapers and are well informed of about the global political affairs, as well as and come geographical and

historical information. . No doubt, their information was limited and superficial, all though it was considered then to be of great significance(19). "This is why people used to stand agape when an Effendi spoke."

We are now addressing the issue of the first seed, so to speak, that grew up into the modern- print media, cultured man and a developed knowledge of worldly life supported by the an authority with higher knowledge authority, i.e. religion. . The mingling of the two will pass through the fences of eternal isolation of tribes and sects. . It will be served by telegraph, railroads, and the print media. . Al-Wardi is addressing the new social interaction between the tribes, cities and villages of Iraq during the Twentieth revolution, with special focus being placed on its content: the creation of the a new identity, the Iraqi identity without its own tools, : nNew telecommunication.

That period of the history of Iraq saw the distinction between what the holy and the non-holy are as envisaged in a new relationship. . The holy used to evaluate matters in a hierarchy topped headed by the holy itself, deeply permeating deeply the world of mankind.

The holy derives its sublimity and value from its ability to getting to the depth bottom of things and controlling them by through the force of the holy word and rituals. . The monopoly exercised by the hHoly will begin a withdrawal from all or part of the social interaction, with the rise of the non-holy earthly knowledge and its bearers: the eEffendis' class. As for the efficiency of this knowledge, it is, firstly, as efficient as the holy, and, secondly, it has the ability to turn the older hierarchy upside down, or at least this is what appears to be the case(20).

XI

Relativity of Knowledge or Manheim's Shield

Adopting a positive approach, Al-Wardi found himself puzzled about Iraqi society while writing his book on historical sociology of the Iraqi society. He did not hide his puzzlement either in the prelude or in the annexes.

He is, first of all, cautious when addressing social bias; the minute preoccupations that look at the past with through the eyes of the present. . He is also hesitant when tackling the ideological questions, in which case he found no shielding methodology except Manheim's relativity to which he claims conspicuous adherence(21).

What is that thing relating an observer to the observed event? What is the guarantee for an accurate observation? ? Al-Wardi finds this

question persisting as any other sociological history scholar would do, while leafing through the past with all its whims and prejudice.

The sociological perspective is incomplete by nature, for reality, as Al-Wardi says, comprises groups. . Hence arise the multiple partial theories. . In other words, objectivity, according to him, is not possible for any part, and objectivity objectivity can no longer be viewed except as an external component approached by a scholar that is separate from the partial groups. . Al-Wardi, however, wonders what could guarantee that the researcher himself will would not fall a captive to a partial view. . In answering that question, he refers the reader to the nature of the society itself, for there is a closed up society (agricultural, traditional) and an open society (the modern industrial).

The closed environment, he says, is a case that is so similar to hypnosis that it makes one see things that do not exist, rendering communal consciousness a sheer fantasy, while multiple visions within a closed society result from that same society being in isolation, and therefore it is a matter of relativity. . In the open society, however, there is a possibility to of monitoring and approaching the subject matter. . But since reality, according to Manheim's thoughts adopted by Al-Wardi, is more or less a multimodal social pyramid, the various conflicting groups in the society would envisage other sides, different from those of that same pyramid, and since the individual is a member of a group, then this vision would not let reality express itself, as it is now segmented and inconsistent(22).

To overcome segmentation and inconsistency is to overcome self- relativity that results from social division, i.e. the

division of patterns of thought by dividing the society into lower and upper classes.

Manheim's relativity annihilates space as it gives some observers in the society the ability to free themselves from social affiliation, just as with the case of senior men of intellect. But this kind of liberation happens thanks to the social status itself. Manheim's relativity also seems to be comprehensive, while the one that Al-Wardi sees is immune from any tampering in the closed society and amenable to manipulation in the open society. . By using Manheim's approach, Al-Wardi enriches his methodology in explaining the bias of small communities in the Iraqi society as this enables him look at the same event from different angles.

The stated relativity of Manheim seems to have another function for Al-Wardi, that which is to pave his way into a solid intellectual arena with power centres

distributed in the 1960 in a particular setting: the Ba'athist state is dominating all institutions, and the Marxist thought (Soviet Marxism in particular) having holds sway over the intellectual sphere. . In this contrast, the institutions are not usually not losers, and in view of this contrast that gives no leeway, and here, Al-Wardi is catering for a special seed that is based on contrast. . In other words, he wanted more than one view to prevail.

As a conclusion of his work, Al-Wardi forgets his first teacher,: Ibn Khaldoun. . He leaves behind implied nomadism, implied while heand has already warned us against the impliedit at the very beginning of the book saying that nomadism is not a communal feeling introspected by the society despite the rise of neo-tribalism(23). And, we have forgotten Ibn Khaldoun's lesson, for in the aftermath of the shift from nomadism to urbanism, an ongoing process, there is a need for a "solid reign"rule. . The factors of modern coherence are still feeble, leading allowing

hidden nomadism to creep in slowly pace from the angles of a Al-Wardi's communal "‘non-consciousness'" (see: Collapsed Nomadic Villages), in addition to powerful reigning rule (See: Army-Baghdad) that faces up to and beats defeats consciousness.

Had Ibn Khaldoun risen from the dead again and seen our presence, he would have said to us in surprise,: ‘Didn't I tell you before that chieftainship is in tribalism!’

References:

- 1) Ali- Al-Wardi, A, Llamahat ijtima'ya min tareekh al-iIraq (Social glimpses on the modern history of Iraq), Dar Kufan, Part 1, p p298.

- 2) Ibn Khaldoun, I (No date), *Al-Muqaddima* (The Introduction), Dar Al-Sha'b, Cairo, dar al-sha'b, (No date), pp 33,, 111-114.
- 3) Ibid, p 147.
- 4) MThe main scholars are Ernest Gellner in his book, 1981, *Muslim Society*, Cambridge, 1981.
- 5) Ibid, p20.
- 6) Al Mamaleek in Egypt are said to used to holdinghave, in wartime, held jewels under their armour for fear of any defeat. Jewels were looked at as movable monetary reserves allowing the start-of of seizure of power anew by using the sword and gold, i.e. the launch of the adventure.
- 7) Gellner, op cit, p 88.
- 8) Termination of tribalism let vulnerableallowed the reign of the Abbasids to become vulnerable as their power did not extend beyond the city of Baghdad until the Deylamites' occupation.

- 9) Al-MuqaddimahKhalidun, op. cit, p 140.
- 10) Al-Wardi mentions lots of cases. No biography of any new ruler of Baghdad was but attached to a number of actions to subdue mutinying tribes.
- 11) In so many instances, Al-Wardi uses the expression "local environment" as a way of showing cautiousness.
- 12) Al-Wardi admits the use of two principle hypotheses: McCarver's dual personality, and O'cBriain's social inconsistency,e as indicated in the second appendix of the first part of Llamhat ijtima'ya (Social Glimpses), etc. His theoretical references are much broader, nonetheless.
- 13) Al-Wardi tends to use the expression: Turkish and Iranian to refer to the Ottoman and the Kajarian states respectively. This is a projection of new names on the older names of the states, for the older states derived legitimacy from the ruling dynasties (Ottoman, Safavids, Kajar, etc.) while legitimacy in modern states is derived from

their people's ethnicities (Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, etc.)

14) The two italicised words here refer to hooligans; young people who seek to show people in public that they are fearless and daring.

15) Hanna Batatou mentions these factors in his interpretation of the imbalance between the rural and the urban in the first chapter of his great book: *The Old Social Classes*.

16) E. Durkheim, E 1984, *Division of labour in society*, Macmillan 1984.

S. Luckes, S and E. Durkheim, E 1973, Penguin 1973, p136.

17) On Sufist groups and scholars, see for example,:

N.R.Keddie, N. R 1972, *Sufis, Saints & Scholars*, London, 1972, P33.

18) See for example Shaler Mustafa Saleem's dissertation: 'Al-Jabayesh', (1970), particularly with regards to those aspects on

the dissolution of intra-tribal ties because of education and migration.

19) Al-Wardi, A, op cit, lamahat (Glimpses) Part 5, Section 1, p35.

20) Al-Wardi, A, op cit, Part 5, Section 1, pp 25 and 35 Al-Wardi, lamahat (Glimpses) Part 5, Section 1, pp 34, 25.

21) See: Bryan S. Turner, B. S 1984, Religion and Social Theory, London, 1984.

22) In his book Ideology and Utopia, Manheim gives an example for the Sophistical school of ancient Greeks, which he considers as a manifestation of a conflict between two forms of explaining things: the mythical approach, and the analytical thinking of the noble and professional classes respectively, p 8.

23) Here, I am referring to national coherence as a replacement of for local coherence of the tribe, the neighbourhood, and the sect.

