

Terrorism and Ethical Legitimacy after 9/11: Philosophical and Strategic Backgrounds of the Principle of Just War

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I. Violence and Good: The Philosophical Background of the Just War Concept:

It can be said that philosophical discourse arose from the problematics of violence and justice according to the Greek conception, the original cradle of philosophy.

Philosophical discourse is the subject of reflection under two interrelated dimensions:

The internal dimension, on one hand, with regards to the question of State and Authority: i.e. the organization of the city from the

perspective of the establishment and the base that ensures the solidarity of the community and its loyalty to the ruling regime.

The external dimension, on the other hand, with regards to the other entities that differ from the Virtuous City as described by philosophy. It has a tendency to violence contrary to the peaceful and moral tendencies of the city of mind and good ideal.

The tradition of both Plato and Aristotle was an expression of this form, based on two related essential ideas:

To consider violence and war a deviation of the system of existence. This system is based on the good as a value that has three, interrelated levels: the universe [metaphysics], the individual [ethics] and the city [politics].

To view justice as harmony with the system of existence and the accomplishment of the ideal of good. This ideal is the principle of harmony in society.

Greek philosophers argue that the sole prerequisite to overcoming the tendency for violence in the human self is to build the city on the ideal of the mind, concomitant with the greater good.(1)

Politics is therefore the activity that organizes communal life according to a higher end, the supreme good. Reality being that the city cannot be organized based on interest or need. It is a reflection of the anthropological essence of the human being, as a social animal. Also, the organization of politics cannot be entrusted to the will of the rulers and the desire of the people; it should be entrusted to philosophers who, alone, can build the adequate social system that respects the system of existence and its ethical essence that can ensure the happiness of humanity.

Furthermore, the principle measure in the city is not the laws, but the rule, the basis of all laws. The rule is the system of civil life and its reflection; it is the *modus vivendi*. Leo Strauss illustrated this Greek conception of politics when he wrote:

Social life is an activity obeying a specific end that society can specify. However, in order for this private end to become a general one, society should be organized, classified and illustrated in a way to mirror this end.

Whichever the case, this means that all those with authority should embrace this same end.(2)

Taken from this perspective, war is not in itself a violent, condemnable act. Its legitimacy derives from the degree of harmony with the ethical code of the city. Heraclites considered war to be the foundation of existence and its instrument, since existence is a constant evolution, modification and a

continuous conflict of opposing sides. To Plato, war is one of the social diseases of a city not founded on the mind. As for Aristotle, it is a type of “hunt” practiced by rulers.

If it is true that medieval Christian thought was influenced by Greek philosophy and adopted its sayings and essential principles, the question of war was nonetheless dealt with in a particular theological context, limited by the values of peace and mercy that Christianity brought forth.

Peace is an essential concept in Christian theology. It is one of the names of the Lord and also a standard of value in individual and social behavior. The message that Christ brought, which is one of lasting and global peace, could only be enforced by the sword and by war. War is then a normal and necessary phenomenon until the Kingdom of the Lord is established.

Thus the existence of two conflicting Christian traditions: The ethical, peaceful tradition on the one hand, and the tradition of

war and defense on the other hand. They both formed the “just war” tradition, as shown and developed through the works of both Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.

According to the “just war” theory in the theological tradition of the Middle Ages, peace is only real when it is based on justice. This is the sole type of peace that can be considered as a higher good. St. Augustine defines just peace as “the stability of the rule”. War is not only justified, but it is also a necessary duty to rectify all and any distortion to which injustice and chaos give birth.

The conditions of a just war in medieval Christian tradition are essentially determined by two criteria: the right to resort to war [Jus ad bellum] and the constraints on its conduct [Jus in bello]. Thomas Aquinas says that a war is just if, and only if, it is preceded by four prerequisites:

- 1- To be a just case: a defense against an unjustified attack, “to make

reparation for an injury or to restore what was wrongly seized.”

- 2- To be waged by a legitimate, qualified authority
- 3- To be the last resort, after all peaceful means are exhausted
- 4- To employ measures compatible with the damage incurred, so they do not lead to an even worse situation.

Seen as such, war is always an exception, a temporary state justified by the requirements of justice which are also those of true peace. Saint Augustine explains that divine authority has also created some exceptions to the forbidding of killing other human beings. In certain cases, the Lord presents murder not as a general law, but as a temporary and an exceptional judgment.(3) Thomas Aquinas clarifies this same idea by saying that the individual puts his life at risk solely for justice. The strong is admirable only if he is also just.(4)

This theological conception of war, even as it was based on absolute criteria of values, and while it limited the legitimate violence to self-defense, was nevertheless an ideological cover to the policy of hegemony of the empire in the Roman Christian times.(5) It is currently used to justify this same policy, as we shall see later on. As for modern political thought in the West, it is distinguished by the evolution from the “Pastoral authority,” as defined by Foucault and based on individuals,(6) to the modern type of the state, based on the concept of contract and common interest.

Leo Strauss, for his part, says:

If both Greek and medieval Christian thought revolved around “the means,” i.e. the establishment of the order of the city according to “the greater good” criterion, be it in its philosophical or religious form, then modern European thought has radically outlawed this approach of politics, based on values.

Politics no longer derives its foundation from a general and stable anthropological basis. The political action is now a plane for creativity, innovation and constant evolution, tailored to suit the interests and wishes of individuals first and later on to suit the historical sense, predominant in modern western philosophy. Starting with Machiavelli and ending with the Age of Enlightenment and the ideologies that ensued from them.(7)

The natural state of humanity is not to be in line with a specific form of a political entity that defines its being and ethical essence. It is, on the contrary, a state of perpetual conflict, an all-front-war, whereas the state is an artificial, contractual state, made to break free from the spontaneous one that in itself embodies the freedom of humanity and its absolute free will.

Hobbes' philosophy was the best illustration of this conception. In addition, he formulated the essential problematic, at the core of political philosophy dialogues

throughout previous centuries: How is it possible to form a lasting social bond on the bases of tendencies to conflict? How is it possible to create lawful and correct relations on the bases of a Law that can, itself, generate conflicts and clashes?

In modern philosophy, there are two distinct sides: The first one considers the contractual state an alienation of personal freedom, for the sake of a common interest [Hobbes]. The second one considers it to be a modification of personal free will into a common communal will that objectively accomplishes the former's essence [Rousseau]. From this perspective, war is not an exceptional, temporary state. It is, in fact, the natural state of humanity, an expression of the tendencies to freedom which are the principle quality of the individual will, unique and independent.

According to Kant, war is the natural, normal state for humans, while peace is an exceptional one. Kant has a conflicting position on war: It is, according to the first

view, the biggest gift nature has bestowed upon humanity. It forces nations and individuals alike to open up to each other and to communicate. It is the means by which a given people expresses its right and freedom to exist through a clash with the other, thus creating a balance of power that ensures peace and safeguards pluralism. The second view states that war is, at the same time, the biggest evil of creation. It turns human beings into instruments for mutual destruction, which is why the mind should work to abolish it completely.

War is then an embodiment of higher freedom and the will to affirm oneself but can only be legitimate when it is defensive. Freedom is neither a state of war nor a state of peace. It is in fact a state of armed peace. War is only for the purpose of defense, one of position and resistance. While peace cannot totally negate the state of conflict, since its own roots derive from the desire to dominate. Peace is not to be the other side of a conflict, a

subsequent stage after the end of a war, but it can and should also thwart war.

Consequently, when Kant presents the first and most important modern project to secure global peace, he depicts it as a consensus, a coalition between armed forces, capable of waging wars. Still, Kant aspires, in his project, to more than the establishment of a simple international contract to prevent wars. Indeed, he develops the frame of a global coalition, founded on the meeting of real liberties, under independent republican regimes whose constitutional system guarantees, by itself the safety and sovereignty of one and all.

Lasting peace among nations finds its source in three principles that Kant details. They are as follows:

1. That each state adopt a constitution for its republic that guarantees the freedom and equality of citizens who abide by the same, common legislation. This form of constitution

prevents wars, because of the legal constraints upon the ruler, who has to refer to the citizens and respect legislations that are in effect.

2. That the law of the people be built on a federation of free states. That means to extend the idea of social contract, the foundation of the legitimacy of modern state, to reach the relations between all nations, while acknowledging the independence and sovereignty of contracting states. This is a question of building a coalition to ensure peace that transcends the simple peace agreement ending a war. It should, therefore, put objective constraints that prevent war and not merely put an end to it. This is not possible if the idea of mutual guarantee of the sovereignty and independence of contracting states is not deeply implemented.

3. That international law respect the conditions of universal hospitality, i.e. to respect strangers and treat them properly, in the

perspective of human dignity and the common belonging to the Human family.(8)

Obviously, out of these principles, the philosophical and moral frames of a new international law will derive later on, as we shall see.

While Kant developed the grounds for modern politics in his logical, critical philosophy, Hegel has, on the other hand, presented the complete study of the model of the contemporary liberal national state. His theory on war is presented under this new approach to politics. Hegel considers war to be essential to the constitution of a state as a political entity that requires loyalty. War is responsible for the creation and completion of human awareness. The will of death turns individual, mortal lives into absolute spiritual ones. The state, for its part, gains sovereignty and freedom through war; it becomes independent both in itself and for itself. The ethical essence of the state is also made more

permanent, after its experience of fatality and destruction.

In opposition to the defensive position of which Kant spoke, Hegel defends an offensive approach, the ultimate end for a war being, in his view, the realization of freedom by snatching away sovereignty and not the entrenchment of oneself for purposes for self-defense.(9) Despite the clear opposition between these two German philosophers, their contradiction does not seem fundamental once we realize that they both express two concomitant tendencies found in the Western state of today: it is both a nation state built on the basis of sovereignty, whose extremes are hostility and expansion, and a liberal state that tends to extend its political system progressively from internal to international horizons, which limits its hostile tendencies.

International law, the direct child of conflicts and balances of our era--an era of wars like those of the European Empires in the nineteenth century and the two destructive World Wars in the twentieth century--was

clearly a mirror to this sway between the pole of sovereignty and that of the limits set by international legislation. If it is true that international law, adopted by the international community in its entirety, has not been successful in preventing wars and conflicts, it is also true that it has somewhat limited them, and established for the first time in history, a legitimate framework to the practice and conduct of war.

II. War on Terror: The Strategic Background for the "Just War" Concept

It became crystal clear, in the aftermath of the Cold War that the strategic balance of the international order had changed, that the old bipolar ideological conflict had subsided. It seemed inevitable that this essential geopolitical factor should leave a trace on the legal and moral authority of this order.

At the time, two distinct theses emerged:

1. The idea of an international partnership, based on unanimity, after the collapse of the communist ideology. The latter was both in theory and in practice a challenge, of a liberal cast, to the international legal order. This idea proposes the implementation of an international law that was to include all domains where it had been lacking.

2. The necessary review of the international legal frameworks, a reflection of global geopolitical balances that no longer exist. The crossing from a bipolar to a unipolar order requires a new international legislation as an alternative to guarantee peace and security worldwide.

Undeniably, the first thesis was soon adopted by intellectual and political circles, as well as civil society organizations in the West. Both conservatives and democrats in the U.S. Administration, under Presidents Bush Sr. and Clinton, made it their own.

As for the material effects of this thesis, they can be seen in the successive initiatives to expand the scope and competence of international law. The first thesis advocated for the inclusion of subjects and concerns once considered as particular to cultures and civilizations of nations and peoples, i.e. family, women, population and human rights. From this standpoint, stakes were high on whether international legislation could solve conflicts and end disputes. Emphasis was put on two interlinked factors:

1. The spread of the democratic, liberal model; its worldwide expansion meant that peace-craving, law-abiding states were increasing in number.

2. The extinction of “hot points” of tension, the previous products of the Cold War.(10)

Bloody conflicts exploded at the end of the Cold War, however, ravaging several regions of the world. They gave the impression that the world, after the bipolar conflict, would be an even more horrific and violent place.(11) Then appeared the need to review international legislation that seemed helpless and ineffective in the face of these new challenges.

From this point, two main tendencies saw the day. The first put the only superpower, the United States of America, in charge of security and intervention to secure world peace. The second believed in treating dysfunctionalities of international law through restrictions to be imposed on national sovereignty, subjected to global human morality, itself the heart and soul of this same international law.

The first tendency is found not infrequently in American literature. Charles Krawthammer, for example, declares that “unipolarity” makes of the U.S. the only state with the responsibility and indeed the duty, of keeping world peace. This is because it is the

only state with the military, diplomatic, political and economic qualifications that enable it to play this role. The U.S. also needs to be in this position because, like the old British Empire, it is a nation of trade, of commercial exchange with other continents. Subsequently, it needs a stable and open space to function well.(12)

American literature on the role of the U.S. in the post-Cold War world nonetheless mostly tries to transpose the American responsibility of leadership onto the heart of international legislation. The U.S. was previously a great contributor to the drafting and formulation of this same legislation. It had embraced its institutional frame as well.

The second tendency, or “the right to humanitarian intervention,” takes root in the modification of the concept of absolute sovereignty. This concept had to a wide extent, preserved the peaceful environment of international relations. Today, however, it has become obsolete. The dynamics of globalization have, indeed, diminished the

independence and distinction of the nation state. These dynamics have also given birth to the concept of world citizenship, a natural complement to universal human rights.

It is a known fact that sovereignty necessitates two sub-criteria: That the state enjoys complete freedom on the internal front, land and people included; and that it forbids all foreign interference in its affairs. The legitimacy of war is thus limited solely to self-defense. This same concept of sovereignty could be, in many cases contradictory with the moral and legal facets of international law: i.e. when a state persecutes a certain minority within its borders or resorts to oppression, extermination or discrimination against its citizens, or in the case of civil war in the light of the absence, or collapse, of the central authority, even if only seemingly sovereign. In this case, is priority given to sovereignty, when it is merely an appearance, on the detriment of people's right to principal, real sovereignty?

True enough, the “right to humanitarian intervention” has found its way to the center of the international legislation, be as it may that it is still at the heart of an extensive debate and a constant reformulation to make sure it does not turn into a pretext for hegemony and illegitimate interference.(13) Although the approach of “the right to humanitarian intervention” has in some ways, overruled a few limitations and restraints of contemporary international law, it is itself a child of the logic and morals upon which this law was founded. It was also an instrument to strengthen and reactivate it, so it can stand firm in the face of the many new dangers and challenges that international legislation has not taken into account.

This approach was laid down according to a different system and ideal than those used to formulate the “just war” principle. Intellectual and political circles in the U.S. have “resuscitated” this principle from the old Christian archives, so it might serve as the basis for a new thesis in international relations,

conforming more, from its point of view, to the biggest challenge facing our world today: transatlantic terror, along with its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

It should be noted that the “just war” theory was spread in departments of international affairs in American universities since the 1970s. It regained its place in the spotlight, when a few academic and religious circles reflected on it in a context that differs from the current one, one in which the call for making war more “ethical” and limiting violence, when the proliferation of nuclear and mass destruction weapons was at its peak.

In 1977 Michael Walzer published *Just and Unjust War*. It is one of the most telling examples of this ethical tendency to rewrite medieval religious theory according to new, liberal grounds.(14) Rejection seemed to be the only response to this approach in international legal and diplomatic circles, until the earthquake that was September 11th 2001 produced a radical shift in U.S. strategic thinking and was, doubtlessly, the element that

paved the way to the adoption of certain measures of “just war” by the American administration, itself in the grip of neo-conservatives and evangelists. Their point of view is still awkward when it comes to breaking free entirely of international legislation.

Ghassan Salame notes that 9/11 has forced radical changes on U.S. strategy for three reasons.

1. The fall of the main pillar of U.S. strategy, the notion of “intervention” rather than the common “offense-defense.” Indeed, U.S. was never, in its recent history since World War II, the scene of a direct threat. The U.S. was always far from external attacks which allowed it to keep to interfering in international conflicts to protect its interests. With 9/11 this equation was changed and this region of the world, just like any other, had become prey to attacks.

2. It is true that the U.S. played a pivotal role in the dynamics of globalization in the last few years. The U.S. has relentlessly promoted globalization and sought to make globalization profitable to its new strategic position as the world's only superpower. It is also true, however, that for the first time, the U.S. had a taste of the other side of globalization. It was attacked with the same tools and innovations that had made its supremacy, like the new communications technologies and electronic financial systems.

3. For the first time in its history, as well, the U.S. switched roles. Once a safe haven and a refuge, it was now victim, seeking help from others. An example is the whole idea of an international coalition against terror, laid down by President Bush. He asked his European as well as Arab partners to provide his country with all information and tools that could contribute to the success of this new war.(15)

After the end of the Cold War, the philosophy behind U.S. strategy was at an impasse over the definition of the threats to the existing world order, lead and controlled by the US. It was uncertain whether they were the quiet conflict between distinct economic poles, or the less theoretical, more material clash between distinct civilizations. But at the end of President Clinton's term, emphasis was being put on the possible dangers of terror and weapons of mass destruction reuniting in what the Democratic administration called "Rogue States."

All the same, it was not until September 11th that terrorism became the main strategic danger and thus the motor for big budgets for defense and wide diplomatic interest. 9/11 forced a reformulation of the doctrine behind U.S. strategy. After the events of September 11th, President Bush talked of "War World on Terror," conceiving of it as being longer and more dreadful than any war ever fought by the U.S. In his address to a joint session of

Congress and the nation on September 20th, 2001, the President said:

“Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”

The documents entitled “The National Strategy to combating Terrorism” and “The National strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction,” both published in 2002, reflect the new strategic doctrine that became even more explicit in the form of the report presented by President Bush to Congress on September 20th of that year. He clearly states that the danger faced by the U.S. in this day and age is terrorism. In illustration, he says:

“The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination...

And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed...

America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few...”

The main point here is describing a strategy responding to terror with preemptive attacks. It was formulated by the policy makers close to the neo-conservative school, who established,

to this end, a complete cultural and media infrastructure.

There are three principles axes to the strategy of fighting terror:

1. To track down all terrorist organizations, through military, intelligence and legal means (transcending all usual diplomatic and legal constraints).

2. To eradicate all weapons of mass destruction and pursue all regimes that produce them, and to topple these regimes, if necessary (the rogue states that Bush grouped in his “axis of evil”).

3. To extend democratic values where they are lacking, since they are a guarantee to American national security and their absence provides fertile grounds for terrorism and extremism.(16)

We are not concerned by an exposé on the origins and structure of the neo-conservatives.(17) We should simply add that this school is different that the one of the traditional, isolationist conservatives whose chief concern is the internal American front and its defense. It also differs from southern Christian fundamentalism, even though the latter counts for a faithful few in President Bush's administration. The president himself does not deny his inclination toward this school.(18)

Neo-conservatives are mostly intellectuals of the revolutionary center-left. Their ideas ad positions are liberal and socially free. Their geopolitical vision is a descendant of the more radical tendency to spread the American model of democracy. Their intellectual sources can be found in the works of the contemporary German philosophers Leo Strauss (who emigrated to the U.S.) and Carl Schmitt.

Leo Strauss (d. 1973) was an eminent critic of modernity. He set out, through a vast study of classical Greek thought and medieval Islamic thought, to rediscover the foundations of political thought. He believed that there are but two essential questions in political philosophy: What is the nature of the political thing? What is the best political regime? To him, both these questions are either distorted or eliminated in modern political thought.

Modern political thought is divided into two trends: A positional one that rejects moral judgment and instead prefers to build a science based on political facts; and an historical one that rejects all distinction between justice and injustice, right and wrong, in the name of proportionality and multilateralism

Leo Strauss concludes from his critique of European modernity that it is necessary to return to the principle of *virtue ad order*, as laid down by Plato and Aristotle, i.e. to build the political model on just values, so it strictly separates good from evil. Strauss warned of the interference of philosophy in the affairs of

the state, all the while providing protection to the ethics of society and its laws that are never to be questioned. The philosophical discourse can prove to be destructive and help the interest of despotism if it does not conform to common sense and values. Basic historical and social facts are only to be divulged to a numbered few, away from the public that is morally fit to understand them. Society needs lies that comfort and protect it.

Based on his thesis, Strauss calls the West to return to its old spiritual and intellectual origins, to recall its true identity and defend its fate. Strauss argues that the crisis the West finds itself in is because it has lost sense of its fate. In past times, the West was assured of its certain fate which can be that of all humans; it also had a clear vision of its future and that of the rest of the peoples. We have lost this assurance and that clarity.(19) So it appears that a return to classical philosophy is definitely a must, to understand our problems and solve them, instead of banking on the sterile modern

political sciences.(20) Neo-conservatives were influenced by this critical vision of cultural pluralism and historical logic that goes back to the middle ages' moral-political pattern, if with a liberal cover.(21)

Carl Schmitt's (d.1958) took interest in politics as occupying center stage in, and being at, the heart of human activity. Politics is the expression of the natural relationship between humans, either friends or foes. The main factor in politics is the righteousness of a decision, regardless of its content and moral value. This is the true factor of sovereignty as defined by Schmitt: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." This is the only determination that fits with sovereignty as a defining term.(22)The existence of the State has a priority over the "validity of the legal criterion," it is necessary then to free decision-making and extract it from all legal obligation.(23)

From this perspective, the purpose of the state or a nation is not to seek peace or civil conciliation, as liberal democracies are prone

to do, as much as it is to safeguard the identity and existence of the state by the only way possible: the negative relationship with an enemy that it faces and against which it mobilizes its forces. The legitimacy of a state is defined by the way the state deals with the “material other” and not by its ethical goals.(24)

The influence of Schmitt and Strauss found its way to U.S. strategic thinking through a professor of Social Science at the University of Chicago, Alan Bloom. He was virulently opposed to the tendency to criticize the western civilization that invaded American campuses in the sixties. In the seventies, Washington’s own Senator, Henry Jackson, held this same conservative banner. He was also violently opposed to The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). He formed a new generation of strategic researchers like Richard Pearle and William Kristol, the two most important pillars of the school of neo-conservatives that is the decision holder in the U.S. today.

Another prominent personality in this school is Paul Wolfowitz, the present Vice Secretary of Defense in the US. He met with Pearle when they were students of Albert Wohlstetter, a researcher at the Rand Corporation, an ex-advisor at the Pentagon and one of the key figures of U.S. nuclear doctrine. This movement has its own, prolific literature which includes magazines like “Review,” “National Review,” “The New Republic,” a weekly magazine “The Weekly Standard,” a TV station “Fox TV,” etc. This school of thought also controls research centers like “The American Enterprise Institute” (www.aei.org), “The Hudson Institute” (www.hudson.org), and “The Heritage foundation” (www.heritage.org).

The principal theory that constitutes the foundation of the neo-conservative school is the priority of the political regime over international institutions and legislation. To this school, the biggest threat to the vital interests of the U.S. comes from states that do not share its political and civic values. So, the

best way to ensure the security of the U.S. is to change despotic regimes and impose democracy.(25) This school has substantially modified U.S. strategic dialogue that had been traditionally loyal to criteria of realism vs. idealism and individual vs. national. These traditions have formed three schools:

1. Individual realism: The isolationist movement that called for the minimum in foreign policy.

2. Multilateral idealism: The movement that advocates for the “export” of democracy and its implementation abroad, according to a U.S. liberal model.

3. Multilateral realism: The pragmatic movement asking that the U.S. play a pivotal role in the world according to its vital interest, with no concern for principles and ideals.

The neo-conservatives are individual idealists who, at once, turn Wilsonian ideals to instruments for imperial hegemony, reject multilateralism considered as a hindrance to the sovereignty of the U.S. and its movement, and adopt a radical revolutionary line by being attached to spreading the American model abroad.(26)

Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, prominent neo-conservatives, explain this new strategic vision in a book they published after the last Iraqi war, the first battle fought in the new war on terror.(27) In this book, *The War Over Iraq*, the two co-authors introduce a detailed reading of the new American way after the Cold War. They review President Bush Sr.'s limited realism, President Clinton's liberal idealism and President Bush Jr.'s "nationalism" that transcended the negativities of both realism and idealism and united efficiency and morality.(28)

The strategic doctrine by which President Bush Jr. abides, which is defended by neo-conservatives is based on three principles that define America's mission in the future and its responsibility toward the world:

1. To move from dissuasion to prevention to face the dangers of terrorism and the spread of WMDs.

2. To move from containment to change of regimes, since despotic regimes represent a threat to American national interests.

3. To move from mystery to leadership, i.e. the U.S. should become aware of its status as a leading nation, responsible for the security and stability of the world.(29)

It is clear that this strategic doctrine completely removes itself from international

legislation in more ways than one. It is also a remarkable development of the way the U.S. deals with contemporary international legal frames that it greatly helped to formulate after the Second World War. These frames were based on two principles:

1. To respect the sovereignty of states and not to interfere in their internal affairs.

2. To tie any violation of this sovereignty to a mandatory decision of the Security Council, that is the sole holder of the right to declare a war legitimate, in the event of a threat to world peace.

This change has the result of moving the mechanism of legitimating a war from within the “nation” organization to a principle of self-legitimating war, with the implication that the positive results of a war confer to it its legitimacy. Preemptive war gives priority to

the moral legitimacy over the legislative tool. The justice of a cause comes before the institutional constraints to guarantee security. It also illustrates how the neo-conservative school is hostile to the United Nations and the norms of international law. The neo-conservative school considers the U.N. and the norms of international law it represents as the result of lobbying and visions of international powers that lack credit. Hence is found the quest to confer a religious and moral legitimacy upon a war that passes over international legitimacy but instead goes back to a concept of “just war” that is an essential reference to the neo-conservative mind.

A wide trend in U.S. strategic research appeared which perceives “just war” as a possible union between the requirements and implications of a unilateral American hegemony on the world and the moral obligations to these requirements. It is also harmonious with the newest prominent challenge to American interests, terrorism. Jean Bethke Elshtain, author of one of the

most important books recently published on the subject,(30) says that it is inevitable that U.S. strategic vision is to be rearranged conforming to the its new responsibility as a leader of the world, facing the danger of terrorism that cannot be dealt with according to the instruments and legislations of Cold War.

Elshtain argues that the legitimacy of war is not defined by the degree of its apparent conformity to an apparent legal apparatus, but by its ethical consequences. She criticizes the descriptive, situational trend dominating western thought, while considering that ethics are present in the process of description, given that “any description of a bad act as a good one is in fact a false description of reality.” The right strategy, therefore, is the ethical one that uses power to reform the world, to eradicate terrorism, rebuild the “failed States” and implement a liberal democratic system throughout the world. In a nutshell, Elshtain writes: “make the world after our image”. She strongly rejects the right to cultural and

civilizational diversity, expediting it as a false illusion. She notably speaks of the reclusion and hostility of Islam versus the open and welcoming Christianity. In the same spirit, James Johnson compares just war in the Christian tradition, a general ethical concept, not confined to its original religious meanings, to the Islamic “jihad,” set on the bases of discrimination and exclusion.(31)

The defenders of this vision are moved by one principal theory: that the reason behind the return to the concept of just war today is to recover the ethical values in managing wars. This can be done by answering the following questions: How can the use of violence secure justice, liberty and order in the world? Which authority can claim the right of resorting to war to achieve this noble end? The starting point in the just war doctrine is the priority of ethical judgment, defended by a legitimate authority whose duty is to secure peace as a world order.(32) We should mention that the use of the just war theory in the context of strategic study entailed its extraction from a

theological context to the domain of international relations, a move which has engendered a diverse and strong debate in the Christian circles, often with the result of refusing this use.

Many Christian intellectuals and clergymen conceived just war as a peaceful inclination to refuse war and seek to impose strict ethical constrictions to the use of force. This idea was meant for a period when war was free from all legal and legislative restraints. Today, however, this term is used for a different purpose--to strengthen the American tendency to hostility. The opposition first begins by distinguishing between the moral and spiritual authority of a religious institution, as a peaceful, guiding authority on the one hand, and the responsibility of the leaders to keep peace and security, on the other hand, since they are according to Saint Paul “the servants of the Lord by means of which the bad are punished.” (33)

This belief was explained by Michael Novak, one the pillars of the American neo-

conservatism, in a lecture at the Vatican during the first war in Iraq.(34) Novak considered that the war on terror naturally entailed disregarding legal constraints. These constraints effectively only apply to traditional wars between states, whereas war against terrorism is an unequal war aimed at preventing mass murder and attacks on unarmed civilians. It is, therefore, necessary, ethically imperative, and legally fair.

Novak details how the concept of just war in a theological context comes from the term “original sin” (as used by St. Augustine in his *Kingdom of the Lord*). So long as the human world is one of evil, conflict and destruction, Christians should face these dangers while staying attached to the obligations of justice and mercy. They should impose world peace as it is, according to St. Augustine, “the stable order.” These concepts and theories were included in a letter by American intellectuals, in the American value foundation (www.americanvalues.org), addressed to Muslims. The letter, entitled

“What we’re fighting for” and to which some of the people mentioned above contributed (James Johnson, Novak Elshain), clearly refers to the theological background of the just war concept to justify a preemptive war on terror.(35)

We need not make explicit the strong relationship between this theological approach and the ideal unilateralism dominating U.S. decision makers.(36)

III. The Deadlock of the Strategy against Terrorism: The Delusion of the Just War

The declared war on terror was allocated the most important financial consideration in history, at a time when the U.S. defense spending was 40% higher than that of the rest of the world. It became a cornerstone of U.S. strategic thinking that promptly calls it “the Fourth World War.”(37) Despite all this, the concept of terrorism itself remains a mystery

in American politico-strategist discourse. It has no formal definition, nor does it conform to a consistent theory. In addition, the strategic approach developed by the U.S. administration in order to fight terror--i.e. the preemptive blow, a child of the just war theory--is unable to contain or face this danger which should be recognized as a significant change in the logic and meaning of wars.

The German philosopher Ludwig Klages noted, at the beginning of last century, that the big cities, formed during the industrial expansion, are a sort of wide human enclave that can catch on fire and burn out in a matter of seconds, with only one strike of lightning from the heavens. Klages refers to the vulnerability of modern urbanization, despite its effective and destructive tools that have increased the threats to humankind instead of ensuring its peace and security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on American soil hit at the heart of the symbols of sovereignty and power at the center of the world's biggest military and economic power. They were proof,

beyond all doubt, of the limitations and vulnerability of the technological power that can be traced back to the nature of the modern technological revolution.

This phenomenon was studied in detail by two French sociologists: Alain Gras and Paul Virilio. Gras thinks that the technological aspects of the new war are no less important than other components like the army or the weapons. There is no sense in speaking about the immense military capacities of the U.S. while leaving out the action-permitting, decision-making system. This is the system that was targeted. To Gras, the question at hand is: Considering that fortification and ramparts were the technical system of the Middle Ages, what would be the visible sites of confrontation and conflict in today's world? It is not a matter of the creativity of terrorist groups. The answer can be found by controlling the indicators showing how the war's technical infrastructure developed.

The modern human being has lived, for a very long time now, in a vast technical

space, invisible and uncontrollable, instant and spontaneous. It is rarely in question or in doubt that the solid tools of control and supervision, set up by modern technology, are infinitesimal, compared to the real space that contains hundred folds of invisible elements. New satellite and communications technologies can read the license plate of a car at the other end of the world. These same technologies, however, are unable to keep track of the dense activities of communication backed and implemented by the present technical revolution, nor can they trace them.

Gras notes, too, that the West has followed, since the nineteenth century, a path that he calls “the train,” meaning a wide web of roads that facilitates the movement of people and merchandise. This artificial region is covered by an information system and run by big control centers that are also checkpoints of some sort. This is the prototype that important modern technical systems have adopted, vulnerable systems in many ways, since communication centers are easy targets:

train stations, airports and destructive nuclear water and power plants. The deadliest of threats are generated from the way these systems are run and organized amid the context of the recurrent danger in which we live: water poisoning, the spread of microbes, and information system viruses.

An additional factor is the social structure of this modern technical reality, present in a third, or a fourth of the world's regions. The rest of humankind is excluded from this reality and does not represent a particular interest to the wealthy who control the new industrial structure of the new communications technologies. We can understand the frustration and the desire for revenge in the circles of the miserable and the unfortunate of the South. These sentiments explain the emergence of groups from different and distinct cultural spaces, joined by the will to attack the weak points of the big technical complex.(38)

To Virlio, the war on terror is the third historical form of war, after the block war (the

battalion to the tank) and the energy war (from gunpowder to nuclear weapons). It is “Infowar,” the equivalent of the second technical revolution. If the era of revolutions has ended, as has ended the era of big wars, the third horizon that offers itself to us is the scene of a destructive urban incident that takes the form of either a power blackout or a devastating epidemic. Terrorism is part of this scene, as the first example of the unlimited war (both in time and place), a hysterical, historically unprecedented scene.

This type of war is not entirely new, as the world was acquainted with one of its forms, the civil war, that undermines political authority from within. Similarly, the nuclear strike on Hiroshima has given birth to a new pattern in war, called “war of dissuasion and the balance of terror.” But terrorism as a phenomenon, based on new communication and destruction techniques, has led to the apparition of indications of a new global civil war.

Virilio showed that this new war is not a conflict between North and South, or East and West, but it is an internal war at the same level of globalization, a web linking various social classes and positions: mafias, religious and sectarian groups and multinational firms that sometimes take a religious or a cultural form, or even an economic or a social one. According to Virilio, we are facing a sort of historical regression, a dangerous tendency that takes us back to the feudalism of the Middle Ages. We gained in space what we lost in historical logic. He continues by saying that these are the “Middle Ages of Globalization,” with their load of unprecedented risks and challenges that cannot be dealt with according to the logic of the electronic strategic doctrine beaten on September 11th 2001.(39)

This entails that the dynamics of terrorism cannot be justified by the traditional geopolitical factors. Terrorism cannot be dealt with through the common ways of war. Indeed, the concept “war on terror” is meaningless, since the enemy is indefinable.

The prominent French philosopher, Jacques Derrida explains that all attempts to define the location, or background of terrorism is a fragile one. It does not, in effect, take into account the radical change in the relationship between the territory, the region and terror, a result of the emergence of the new techno-industrial system that annihilated all distinction between war and terrorism. Europe and the United States are also homes that harbor terrorism, export it worldwide and train terrorists, as the September 11th attacks showed.(40)

Beaudrillard goes even further, to say that the motion of terrorism is one of the essential components of present order of globalization. It cannot be read from the outside because it is the other side of the coin, encrusted in a global order of a universal aspect. Terrorism is a radical expression of the will to break free from a system that controls all functions through the technocratic mechanism and unilateral thought. It is subsequently a deep and hard will to introduce

difference and particularity into a closed system, although at the detriment of human lives and the wide annihilation of all. It is therefore a child of this system and a reaction to it. The matter at hand is not a clash of civilizations or religions, as the media promote. It is, in fact, a deep and essential collision of what is behind the ethereal images of the U.S. and Islam, a clash within the epistémé itself, a fracture internal to its essence.

This new war is the first “World War,” literally, because it is the war of globalization and concerns all humans. The first two World Wars were traditional wars, in the sense that the first one ended European supremacy and colonialism while the second one defeated Nazism. As for the Third World War, the Cold War, it annihilated communism. With the end of each war, the world was moving closer to unilateralism. The first step was from multilateralism to bipolarity, then from the latter to the present unilateralism. This unilateralism would never have led to a state

of global peace, but instead it unleashed all forms of rejection from the margins and all desires for distinction and particularity, although they are difficult to classify and identify.

It was naïve to think that the end of communism would lead to the triumph of good over evil, the end of injustice, violence and exploitation. This thought originated in the utopia of progress, carried by the western Age of Enlightenment. It was thought that humanity's economic, technical, democratic, and human rights progress would necessarily lead to the complete eradication of evil, but the two concepts are concomitant and belong to the same instant.

The origin of the shock that the 9/11 attacks sparked, may very well be traced to the fact that these terrorist attacks targeting the centers of the U.S.'s economic and military prowess confront the world order with an indefinable enemy. There are no known ways to fight this enemy, to the extent that the only recourse is for the state to parade its military

power to confirm the traditional concept of war, i.e. the type of war whose effectiveness is defined by military balance.

These attacks were proof that the traditional instruments of dissuasion are ineffective for the defense of a system whose prowess and strength made it vulnerable and weak. This system has, in fact, created a strategy to eliminate danger but was no longer ready to pay the death bill, a deadly weapon in the hands of suicide bombers. Therefore, it is all about death. Not only in the real sense of the word, but also in its symbolic and mythological connotation, which views death as an absolute and final act. The spirit of terrorism is to reach the farthest possible end of reality and then undermine the whole system through the weight of this reality. That is done by using the only type of violence unavailable to the dominating power: self-execution.

Terrorist groups do not attack the world order with its own tools. Rather, they use a symbolic weapon, “domesticated” by a

modern technical civilization which thought that it had triumphed over the world. This way, the international forces that dominate the world are unable to contain terror or win it over. Preemptive wars are wars of “mourning and compensation,” as Beaudrillard describes them. They are not events then, but precise police operations, so predictable that they are no longer necessary. Their aim is to prevent harm before it happens. The problem raised by these wars is that they seek to stop an event that will not take place, since it is prevented from happening before it actually does. They are unable, although, to prevent events that cannot be anticipated.(41)

The war on terror, in the American sense of the concept--preemptive just war, outside the scope of international legitimacy--is, in its logical conclusion, close to the logic of terrorism. Derrida says that the experience of terror as such is not limited to terrorism. If it were, then what would be the distinction between organized and instigated terror from one side, and the fear that a complete

philosophical tradition, extending from Hobbes to Schmitt might be considered as imperative to political practice and the foundation of the state on the other side? Where is the line separating the use of violence in the context of a legitimate war and the condemnation of this same violence as an immoral act?

Derrida claims that sovereignty is not in itself a context for the legitimacy of violence. More accurately, it is this concept of sovereignty that carries inside of it the imperial tendency to expansion that leads to the break with legitimacy. With the onset of preemptive war comes the collapse of the entire semantic logic of the political and legal system that once distinguished democratic, legitimacy-bound states from rogue states.(42)

The ethical aspect of the “just war” cannot confer required legitimacy upon preemptive war. The reason for this is that it breaks away from the common context of international legality--the result of an objective embodiment of an entire system of values,

based on geopolitical facts and balances that are modifiable and reviewable. At the same time, though, it takes the world back to the logic of religious wars in the Middle Ages, wars that were based on the same double background that we perceive in the new U.S. strategic thought: to thwart evil by eradicating it first and then replacing it with good (i.e., liberal, American values).

It is a known fact that one of the most important achievements of modern political thought is the distinction it established between ethics as such in their absolute dimension (ethics of conviction according to Max Weber) and ethics in their objective dimension (ethics of responsibility, again according to Weber). This distinction is imposed by the re-examination of the old metaphysical concept of values. It regarded values as included in the order of existence itself, deriving their imperative quality from the value of truth. It was no longer possible to use these concepts after the entire philosophical order backing them collapsed

(the unity of the mind and existence, the one, non-historical qualities of truth).

German philosopher, Jorgen Habermas shows that ethical sentiments can lead to wrong things, since they are a response to particular scenes or images. There is no possible way to control legitimacy as a whole. Is it possible to replace the course where legitimacy is defined by international law by another course where the international unilateral policy enforced by a dominating power that confers legitimacy on its own actions?

If the U.S. administration objects to the order of international law, because that law hinders the efficiency of the U.S. goals, then practical hindrances to the efficiency of the alternate approach are even more difficult and acute. The international community has become complex in such a way that makes controlling it from a specific center, with the aid of military power, virtually impossible.

The Hobbesian way of unilateral security strategy is worthless in the face of the objective facts of multiple market networks and the contexts of cultural communication and a universal society . When unilateral dominance is practiced by a liberal democratic state, it leads to the demolition of the foundations and bases of values which that state aspires to defend and spread throughout the world. This is because the state is focusing on police intelligence activity and military spending with the clear weight of negative consequences on the internal liberties of the state. An example to this can be found in the experience liberal European states have had with colonialism. Habermas says that it is the universal Taoist aspect of democracy and human rights that stops these two things from being imposed by force and unilateral domination.

The West's belief that its basic political values are universally and globally viable should not be confused, according to Habermas, with the imperialist ambition to

impose a given culture or political system on other societies by force or compelling. This is the pattern of universality that old empires resorted to in order to conquer the world, the “other” that it only saw after its own image. The modern depiction of the self is based, unlike the one in the Middle Ages, on the foundation of justice. It entails transcending the confines of the self to discover the other, and explore the other's difference, a prerequisite to exchange and communication.

This depiction is made complete in American pragmatic philosophy, founded on the idea that what is right and just for all is defined by the ability of all parties to adopt the other party's choice. Modern international law refuses a monopoly on its universal values, or the possession of these values as with any other merchandise that can be possessed, distributed and exported. Values do drift away, unsupported. If these values require imposition by an authority, then the authority is developed and activated within the specific patterns and practices under specific cultural forms.(43)

*) A Mauritanian university Professor. He works in the Arab Organization Alexo in Tunisia.

[1] - See on Greek political thought - VERNANT Jean, *Les Origines de la Pensee Grecque*, PUF 9eme ed., 2002

2 - STRAUSS Leo, *Qu'est-ce que la Philosophie Politique ?* PUF, 1992, p39. We will see that Leo Strauss himself adopts this vision which has influenced the school of neo- conservatives in the USA.

3 - Saint Augstin, *La Cite des Dieux*, Garnier, p.41

4 - Saint Thomas D'aquinin, *Somme Theologique: la Force*, ed de La Revue des Jeunes, 1926, p.52

5 - See, on the "Just War" theory in Christian tradition: WALZER Michael, *Just and*

Unjust War: a Moral Argument with Historical Illustration, New York Basic Books, 1977.

6 - Foucault summed up the basic qualities of the pastoral authority in the Christian depiction in three points: - It is not a forceful or compelling authority; its desired objective is to always be ready to sacrifice for the life and security of the “herd”. -It cannot be carried out with the whole group; each individual should work alone during his lifetime. - It cannot function without reading people’s minds, discovering their souls and putting them through tests. It requires having a good knowledge of awareness and conscience, to direct them. See, by the author, *al-Ta'rikh wa al-haqiqah liday Mishal Fukaw*, Beirut: al-Dar al-Arabiyah li-l-Ulum, 1994, p. 187-198.

7 - STRAUSS Leo, *Droit Naturel et Histoire*, Plon, 1954

8 -. KANT Emmanuel, « Vers la Paix Perpetuelle: Esquisses Philosophiques” in

Vers la Paix Perpetuelle, que Signifie s'orienter dans le Pensee ? Qu'est-ce que les Lumieres ? Flammarion, 1991, p 84-97.

9 - HEGEL, *Principes de la Philosophie du Droit*, traduction de KERVEGAN J.F., PUF, 2003. See on War Philosophy in modern thought : PHILONERKO Alexis, *Essai sur la Philosophie de la Guerre*, Vrin, Paris, 1988.

10 -Fukuyama's theory, spread in the beginning of the nineties, reflected this vision FUKUYAMA Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, The Free Press, 1992

11- See : DELMAS P., *Le Bel Avenir de la Guerre*, Gallimard, Paris, 1990

12 - KRAUTHAMER Charles, "the unipolar Moment," in *Foreign Affairs*, 1990-1991/1, p. 22-33

13- See Mario Bettati's important book on the subject BETTATI Mario, *Le Droit de l'ingérence : Mutation de L'ordre International*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 1996. In this book, Bettati defines the right to

intervention [p.12]. Compare to, by the author: ASSAYED WILD ABAH, "War and Legitimacy in the Globalization Era, the Right to Humanitarian Intervention and The Concept of Diminished Sovereignty," in *Ittijahat Al Awlama* [the Paths of Globalization], Arab Cultural Center, Beirut, 2001, p. 51-82 (in Arabic).

14 - LEMENIER Bertrand, «La Notion de Guerre Juste, Revue et Corrigée par le Libéralisme» in *Le Quebequois Libre*, numéro 523, 12/4/2003. See the critique of this theory in PRZETACZNIK Frank, "The Illegality of The Concept of Just War under Contemporary International law", in *la Revue de Droit International des Sciences Diplomatiques et Politiques*, Vol. 70, afl.4, p. 245-298, 1992.

15 - See Ghassan Salame's thesis in: SAYYED WILD ABAH, "International Coalition against Terrorism: gaps and obstacles," *al-Sharq al-awssat*, Oct 7th, 2001 (in Arabic).

16 – See: RICE Condeleeza, “Promoting the National Interest,” in *Foreign Affairs*, Jan-Feb 2000. PODHORETZ Norman, “How to Win World War IV?” *Commentary*, Feb 2002. TETRAIS Bruno, *la Guerre Sans Fin: l’Amérique dans L’engrenage, La Republique des Idees*, Seil, p.32-38, 2004. HASSNER Pierre et VAISSE Justin, «Washington et le Monde : Dilemme d’une Surpuissance» *CER/ Autrement*, p.111-119, 2003.

17 - On Neoconservatives thought and origins, see: SHALAK Al Fadel, *The Return of Colonialism and the American War on Arabs*, Dar AnnaFa’is, Beirut, p.11-45, 2004 (in Arabic). HASSNER Pierre et VAISSE Justin, «Washington et le Monde : Dilemme d’une Surpuissance» *CER/ Autrement*, 2003

18 - A lot of ink was spilled on Bush’s fundamentalism who is a follower of the “United Methodist Church”. Vice preside Dick Cheney and Attorney General John Ashcroft also follow Bush’s example. Bush is a “Born again”; his entourage is made up

of extremist Evangelicals, who have a large popular backup from approx. 70 million people in the USA. Bush's speech, as well as that of his administration, contains a lot of religious concepts and symbols. See: TINCQ Henry, «Le Choc de Deux Fondamentalisme» in *Le Monde*, 1/4/2003

19 - STRAUSS Leo, *La Cite et L'homme*, Agora, p.10, 1987

20 - ibid. p. 19

21 - Leo Strauss writes in the introduction of his new book *Old and New Liberalism* "Conservatives today are tomorrow's progressist. They do not defend honor, but democratic values as they were first formulated. According to that formulation, the need is for the value of moderation rather than fiery, provocative declarations of today's progressists".see: XENOS Nicholas, *Leo Strauss and the Rhetoric of War on Terror*, Logos, Spring 2004.

22 – See: SCHMITT Carl, "Quatre Chapitres sur la Théorie de la Souveraineté [1922]," in *Théologie Politique*, Gallimard, p.15, 1988

23 - ibid. p 22-23

24- SCHMITT Carl, *La Dictature* [1921], ed. Le Seuil, 2000

25 - On Leo Strauss and the Neoconservatives, see: FRACHON Alain et VERNT Daniel, «Le Stratège et Le Philosophe» in *Le Monde*, 16/4/2003

26 - On American Strategy Schools, see: HASSNER Pierre et VAIS Justin, *Washington et le Monde*, p.16-32

27 - KAPLAN Lawrence f. and KRISTOL William, *the War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*, Encounter Books, 2003

28 - ibid. p.37-75

29 - ibid p.79-125

- 30 - ELSHTAIN Jean Bethke, *Just War Against Terror: the Burden of American Power in a Violent World* Basic, 2003
- 31 - JOHNSON James Turner, "Jihad and Just War," in *First Things*, 124 June/ July, p12-14, 2002. also by him: *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions*, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997
- 32 - WEIGEL George, "Moral Clarity in a Time of War," in *First Things*, Jan.2003
- 33 - See: - PALVISCHEK Kate, "Just War and Counterterrorism," *The Center of Public Justice*, 24/9/2001
- 34 - See lecture: NOVAK Michael, "A symmetrical Warfare and Just War," in *National Review*, Feb.2003
- 35 - See thesis and comment: ASSAYED Ridwan, *Conflict over Islam: fundamentalism, reform and international policies*, Dar Al Kitab Al Arabi, p-59-75, Beirut, 2004 (in Arabic).

- 36 - See important critical study: FERGUSON Neil, *The Price of America's Empire*, Penguin Press, 2004.
- 37 – See: RAMONET Ignacio, «De la Guerre Perpetuelle», in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Mars 2003, p1-19
- 38 - GRAS Alain, *La Fragilite de la Puissance*, Fayard. 2003
- 39 – See: VIRILIO Paul, *Ville Panique*, Galilee, 2004
- 40 - DERRIDA Jacques, «Qu'est-ce que le Terrorisme ?», in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Feb, 2004, p16.
- 41 - BEAUDRILLARD Jean, *L'esprit du Terrorisme*, Galilée, 2002. and *Power Inferno*, Galilée, 2003. *La Violence du Monde*, [with MORIN Edgar], Institut du Monde Arabe, 2003
- 42 – See: DERRIDA Jacques, *Voyous*, Galilée, 2003

43 -See also important articles by him -
HABERMAS J. :La Statue et les
Révolutionnaires », in *Le Monde*, 3/5/2003. -
«Qu'est-ce que le Terrorisme ?» *Le Monde
Diplomatique*, p.17, Feb.2004